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Article
Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual
Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
DAVID C. HOLMAN
Confusion reigns in federal courts over whether crimes qualify as “violent felonies”
for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA requires a fifteenyear minimum sentence for felons convicted of possessing a firearm who have three prior
convictions for violent felonies. Many offenders receive the ACCA’s mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years based on judges’ guesses that their prior crimes could be
committed in a violent manner—instead of based on the statutory crimes for which they
were actually convicted. Offenders who do not deserve a minimum sentence of fifteen years
may receive it anyway.
The courts’ application of the ACCA is also underinclusive. Although the ACCA
defines “violent felony” to include all crimes “involving conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of bodily injury to another,” a 2008 Supreme Court decision has drastically
narrowed the so-called residual clause. Begay v. United States held that crimes fall under
the residual clause only if they are “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” as a matter of law.
This imprecise, extra-statutory formula has resulted in the exclusion of some seriously risky
crimes of recklessness and negligence, and created tension with the nearly identical “crime
of violence” definition in the career offender sentencing guideline.
This Article is the first to survey ACCA jurisprudence after Begay and the Court’s
2009 decision in Chambers v. United States and to detail the conflict between these
decisions, the text of the ACCA, and the Court’s prior precedent. This Article offers lower
courts a way to apply the ACCA’s residual clause with greater respect for the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, the statutory text, and precedent. First, courts should
narrowly construe Begay’s requirement of “purposeful” conduct to exclude strict liability
crimes from the residual clause but include crimes of negligence and recklessness. Second,
courts should read Begay’s “aggressive” requirement as a rhetorical flourish without any
meaningful distinction from its “violent” requirement. Third, despite Begay’s apparent
invitation to do otherwise, courts should strictly follow the “categorical approach” as set
forth in Taylor v. United States. The net result of these three steps would be a greater
faithfulness to the text of the ACCA: courts applying the residual clause would include only
those crimes whose elements require violent conduct while excluding those crimes whose
elements do not require violence or any mens rea.
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Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual
Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
DAVID C. HOLMAN *
I. INTRODUCTION
Involuntary manslaughter is not a violent felony. Possession of a
dangerous weapon is inherently violent. Driving away from the police is
necessarily aggressive. Welcome to the bizarre world of the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”),1 brought about by a poorly drafted statute and a
conflicting morass of Supreme Court and appellate case law. Essentially,
the ACCA requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for repeat offenders
convicted of possessing a firearm who have three prior convictions for
violent felonies.2 In defining which crimes qualify as violent felonies, the
ACCA includes any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”3 In Begay v. United
States, the Supreme Court limited this residual clause to crimes that
involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct.4
The case of Melvin Spells illustrates the often whimsical application of
the ACCA after Begay. When a police officer saw Spells driving without
wearing his seatbelt, the officer turned on his lights to pull Spells over.5
Spells refused to pull over, earning him a state felony conviction for
fleeing law enforcement.6 Years later, Spells faced federal sentencing for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, among other crimes.7 A felon-inpossession conviction would normally carry a maximum sentence of ten
* Former law clerk to Hon. Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. J.D. 2009, William & Mary School of Law; M.A. 2004, The University of Chicago; B.A.
2003, Providence College. Many thanks are due to Jane Elizabeth Holman, my patient wife and truly
indispensible editor, and to James Bilsborrow, Julie Blake, Steven Holman, Professor Paul Marcus,
Christian Miller, George Mocsary, Professor Jack Morton, Professor Michael O’Hear, Anupama
Sawkar, Arpan Sura, Robert Tepper, and David Tyler for their helpful comments. Any mistakes are
my own.
1
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401–02, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)). Congress first passed the ACCA in 1984, and amended it to its
present form in 1986. For an in-depth review of the legislative history, see James G. Levine, Note, The
Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–48 (2009).
2
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
3
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
4
553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2008).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 744.
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years in prison. But the sentencing court found that Spells had three prior
convictions for violent felonies, including his conviction for fleeing law
enforcement, making him eligible for the ACCA’s mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years in prison.9 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
determined that Spells’s conviction for fleeing law enforcement entailed
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as a matter of law, as required
by Begay.10 The appellate court admitted that the statutory elements of the
crime did not require violent or aggressive conduct for a conviction.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the crime is legally violent and
aggressive because the offender’s flight “calls the officer to give chase, and
. . . dares the officer to needlessly endanger himself in pursuit.”11 This
judicial reasoning made the difference of at least five years in prison for
Melvin Spells. Similar reasoning has concluded that crimes such as the
mere possession of a dangerous weapon and larceny are inherently violent,
leaving circuits split over whether certain crimes are violent felonies.12
The battle over the application of the ACCA is fought over whether a
defendant’s three prior convictions fall within the meaning of “violent
felony” or “serious drug offense,” therefore triggering the ACCA. Under
the text of the ACCA, a felony is violent if it fulfills any one of three
conditions: (1) it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another,” (2) it “is burglary,
arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives,” or (3) it “otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”13 This Article focuses on the contentious “otherwise” or
“residual” clause—the ill-defined third option. At sentencing, federal
prosecutors often take a broad view and argue that physically stealing from
a person,14 criminal trespass to a dwelling,15 and fleeing law enforcement16
should all qualify as violent felonies under the residual clause.
Defendants, of course, prefer a narrower construction. Despite frequent
litigation, a standard definition of a “violent felony” has proven elusive.
8

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
Spells, 537 F.3d at 745.
10
Id. at 751, 753–54.
11
Id. (“An individual’s purposeful decision to flee an officer in a vehicle when told to stop,
reflects that if that same individual were in possession of a firearm and asked to stop by police, they
would have a greater propensity to use that firearm in an effort to evade arrest.”).
12
See infra Part V.C (discussing circuits’ analysis of sexual crimes against children) and V.D.2
(discussing circuits’ analysis of fleeing law enforcement).
13
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2006).
14
United States v. Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2010) (addressing a Missouri
conviction for physically stealing from another in violation of MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030, which
requires proof of the use of force).
15
United States v. Corner, 588 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 2009) (addressing Wisconsin conviction
for criminal trespass to a dwelling in violation of WIS. STAT. § 943.14).
16
Spells, 537 F.3d at 749–50 (addressing Indiana conviction for fleeing law enforcement in
violation of IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)).
9
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The residual clause is problematic because lower federal courts are torn
between the text of the ACCA, a complex analysis known as the
“categorical approach,” and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Begay
v. United States, which requires that a prior conviction be “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive” to fall under the residual clause.17 This Article is
the first to survey the residual clause’s various problems after Begay,
particularly the conflict between the text of the residual clause, the
categorical approach, and Begay.18
Federal courts must reconcile two nearly contradictory strains of
ACCA case law. The first strain has mandated a “categorical approach” in
determining whether a particular crime constitutes a violent felony. Under
the categorical approach, courts may examine only the fact of the prior
conviction, the statutory elements of that offense, and, in rare cases, the
charging documents, jury instructions, or plea agreements.19 In other
words, the prior conviction must be a violent felony as a matter of law—
not just a felony committed in a violent manner in that particular case.
For example, state statutes defining the crime of witness tampering
may not require any violent act: to commit the crime, a person needs only
to induce a witness to testify falsely or not testify.20 The person convicted
of witness tampering may have committed the crime in a violent way, like
killing the witness in order to prevent his testimony. But that violence
does not make the crime legally or categorically violent because the
government never had to prove an element of violence to secure a
conviction. Consequently, a conviction under one of these statutes, even
where a witness had been killed, would not fall within the residual clause
and, accordingly, the defendant would not be subject to heightened
sentencing under the ACCA. The categorical approach restricts a
sentencing court’s consideration of prior convictions to those elements
actually proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the
defendant, thereby protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.21
17

553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008).
Begay’s interpretation of the ACCA has received no substantial coverage in legal journals
except for brief case comments and reviews of the 2007–2008 Supreme Court Term. More generally,
the most recent treatment of the ACCA is discussed in Levine, supra note 1, at 547 (assessing the
ACCA’s implications). See also Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, But Incomplete:
The Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1409 (2008) (arguing for a uniform generic standard of the
sentencing requirement without discussing Begay).
19
See infra Part III.A (explaining the categorical approach in greater detail).
20
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-707 (2009) (defining the crime of tampering with a
witness or victim); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.050 (2006) (defining same); N.H. REV. STAT. § 641:5
(2007) (defining same). But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (proscribing killing, using
physical force or the threat of physical force, or attempted killing or use of force with intent to prevent,
influence, or delay testimony).
21
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
18
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The second strain of case law limits the scope of the residual clause to
crimes similar to the crimes enumerated in the preceding clause.
According to Begay, the enumerated crimes “limit[] the crimes that [the
residual clause] covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as
in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves.”22 Crimes are similar
in kind if they—like the enumerated crimes—“typically involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”23 Theoretically, Begay is
perfectly compatible with the categorical approach. Courts simply
determine whether the statutory elements of the prior offense of conviction
require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. But the practical
application of Begay is different for two reasons.
First, Begay and its offspring contain language undermining the
categorical approach. The Court suggested that lower courts should
examine the “ordinary” or “typical” commission of the statutory offense.
But how a crime is typically committed may vary from what the statutory
elements actually require for conviction.24 The example of Melvin Spells
illustrates this conflict. The Seventh Circuit may have correctly concluded
that the crime of fleeing law enforcement typically involves violence
because the pursuing officer will often give chase, risking harm to himself
and bystanders. But violent conduct is not required in order to convict
under the statute. Mr. Spells may have been driving on a deserted street.
Or Mr. Spells, while refusing to stop, may have never exceeded the speed
limit and may have obeyed all traffic laws. Improbable? Perhaps. But
possible. Begay introduced another subjective consideration that veers
from the statute and the categorical approach: it instructed lower courts to
consider whether the prior crime is one that indicates the criminal is likely
to use a weapon to harm a victim in the future.25 This consideration also
creates tension with the categorical approach.
Second, some courts have resisted Begay’s newly fashioned
requirement that violent felonies be purposeful, violent, and aggressive.
Instead of Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement,
some courts continue to apply the unglossed statutory requirement that the
22

Begay, 553 U.S. at 143; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (“The
specific offenses enumerated in clause (ii) [of the ACCA] provide one baseline from which to measure
whether other similar conduct ‘otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.’”
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006))).
23
Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
For example, a person may have killed someone while engaging in some other non-violent
criminal activity, but only been convicted of the latter crime because evidence of one element was
lacking with respect to the former.
25
Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (“[Purposeful, violent, and aggressive] conduct is such that it makes
more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.
Crimes committed in such a purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner are ‘potentially more
dangerous when firearms are involved.’” (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (2006)
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part))).
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prior crime pose a serious potential risk of physical injury. Other courts
use Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, but apply it
to the “typical” or “ordinary case” with reasoning at odds with the
categorical approach.27
This Article aims to help lower courts resolve the conflict between
Begay and the categorical approach by identifying the major pitfalls in
applying the ACCA after Begay and suggesting the ideal post-Begay
application of the categorical approach. Part II examines the text of the
ACCA and presents some basic principles in interpreting the residual
clause. Part III explains Supreme Court precedent regarding the ACCA,
focusing on Taylor v. United States,28 James v. United States,29 Begay, and,
most recently, Chambers v. United States.30 Part IV exhibits several of
Begay’s various inherent problems. Part V sets out four chief difficulties
in implementing Begay.
Finally, Part VI proposes an application of the ACCA that is more
consistent with the statutory text and the categorical approach. First,
courts should narrowly construe Begay’s mens rea holding and read it as
excluding only strict liability crimes from the residual clause while
including crimes of negligence and recklessness. Second, courts should
read Begay’s “aggressive” requirement as a rhetorical flourish without any
meaningful distinction from “violent.” Third, despite Begay’s apparent
invitation to do otherwise, courts should strictly follow the categorical
approach and apply the residual clause to only those crimes with elements
that require the underlying conduct be violent while excluding those crimes
with elements that do not require violence or any mens rea.
II. THE TEXT OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
As stated above, the ACCA31 mandates a sentence of at least fifteen
years in prison for felons convicted of possessing a firearm and who have
at least three prior convictions for a violent felony, a serious drug offense,
or both.32 For purposes of the ACCA, a “violent felony” is any crime
26

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
28
495 U.S. 575 (1990).
29
550 U.S. 192 (2007).
30
129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).
31
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401-02, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)).
32
Section 924(e)(1) states:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than fifteen years . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
27
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punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that “(i) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .”33
The first clause of the violent felony definition is relatively
straightforward in its application. Either a crime contains one of those
elements or it does not. For example, any kind of attempted or completed
homicide or assault (excluding felony murder) has as an element the use or
attempted use of force. The second clause is more difficult for two
reasons. First, the ACCA does not define the enumerated crimes. While
those crimes are familiar concepts in American law, states may define
them differently.34 Second, the residual or “otherwise” clause of clause (ii)
is deceptive. At first blush, the residual clause seems sweeping—it
includes any other crime that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury.35 Statutory rules of construction, however, limit its scope. Where
general words follow specific ones in a list, the canon of ejusdem generis
suggests that “the general words are construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.”36 Such is the case in the ACCA. The residual clause should
therefore include only crimes that are “similar in nature” to burglary,
arson, extortion, or crimes involving use of explosives.37
33

Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
The variety of state burglary statutes required the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990), to craft a generic definition of burglary. See supra notes 41–44 and
accompanying text.
35
This was the Government’s position in Begay.
36
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 253–54
(2000) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 188
(Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992)). Despite some scholars’ criticism of canons in the mid-twentieth
century, “a large and growing number of academics . . . now believe in the utility of canons of
constructions . . . and . . . the newly faithful cover a broad philosophical spectrum” from Scalia to
Sunstein. John F. Manning, Legal Realism & The Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D. 283, 284 (2002);
see, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 407–08 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that ejusdem generis limits FCC’s authority under general provision,
“[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out the provisions of this chapter,” to interstate and foreign communications because the
preceding section pertained “exclusively to ‘interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio . . . .’” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(a))).
37
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (“The specific offenses enumerated in clause
(ii) provide one baseline from which to measure whether other similar conduct ‘otherwise . . . presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii))); see also Begay v.
United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150–51 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court is correct that the
clause . . . signifies a similarity between the enumerated and unenumerated crimes.”); James, 550 U.S.
at 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he most natural reading of the statute is that committing one of the
enumerated crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives) is one way to commit a
crime ‘involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’; and that
other ways of committing a crime of that character similarly constitute ‘violent felon[ies].’”). But see
Begay, 553 U.S. at 162 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The statute does not say that these offenses must present
at least as much risk as the enumerated offenses.”).
34
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Finding similarities across those four crimes is a challenge. The
Model Penal Code’s definitions of burglary, arson, and extortion do not
contain any common element besides specific intent.38 The use of
explosives, however, “may involve merely negligent or reckless
conduct,”39 a feature that eliminates the one commonality of the first three
crimes. Although the enumerated crimes lack any common elements, they
are all serious crimes with potential for violent consequences. Burglary
could lead to a confrontation with the occupant or owner of the target
structure. Also, because burglary requires “breaking and entering,” it
involves violence to property.40 Arson may entail the destruction of a
building and a great risk of harm to persons. Extortion may involve theft
by the threat of violence. The use of explosives could harm persons or
property, especially if used recklessly. Without any other obvious threads
connecting the four enumerated crimes, courts have had to take an active
role in clarifying the residual clause’s ambiguity.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING THE ACCA
The Supreme Court’s ACCA jurisprudence addresses two main issues:
(1) what information courts may consider in determining whether a crime
is a violent felony, and (2) which crimes fall under the residual clause.
A. Taylor and James: The Categorical Approach Meets the Residual
Clause
The Supreme Court has mandated a “categorical approach” for
determining whether a crime qualifies as a “violent felony” under the
ACCA. Taylor v. United States41 addressed whether a Missouri conviction
for second-degree burglary qualified as the “burglary” listed among the

38
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (“A person is guilty of arson, a felony of the second degree, if he
starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied structure
of another; or (b) destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or another’s, to collect
insurance for such loss.”); id. § 221.1 (“A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or
occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to
enter.”); id. § 223.4 (“A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by
threatening to: (1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense; or (2) accuse
anyone of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or
cause an official to take or withhold action; or (5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other
collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in
whose interest the actor purports to act; or (6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or (7) inflict any other harm which would
not benefit the actor.”).
39
Begay, 553 U.S. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1.
41
495 U.S. 575 (1990).
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ACCA’s enumerated crimes. After establishing a generic definition of
“burglary” for ACCA purposes,43 Taylor specified how lower courts
should determine if a state burglary offense qualifies as a “burglary” under
the ACCA. The ACCA, the Taylor Court held, “generally requires the trial
court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of
the prior offense.”44 The sentencing court may look beyond the fact of the
conviction “in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required
to find all the elements of generic burglary.”45 For example, a conviction
based on a burglary statute that can be violated in multiple ways—such as
either entering a vehicle or entering a building—is a violent felony only if
the jury had to find that the defendant entered a building, thereby meeting
the Court’s generic burglary definition.46 In other words, the categorical
approach restricts a sentencing court’s fact-finding to the existence of a
prior conviction and its statutory elements. When necessary, the court may
use charging documents to examine which part of a disjunctive statute the
defendant violated, but not how she violated it. That secondary step, where
permitted, is restricted to the “indictment or information and jury
instructions . . . .”47 In the case of a guilty plea, because no trial occurred,
the sentencing court may examine “the terms of a plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between the judge and defendant in which the factual
basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant . . . .”48
Consider the burglary example above. If the fact of conviction does
not reveal whether the defendant entered a building or entered a vehicle,
then the sentencing court may review the charging documents, or any plea
agreement or colloquy. If those documents show that he was charged with
entering a building, then the categorical approach allows the court to find
that he committed burglary under the ACCA. If, however, those
documents do not clarify which subsection the defendant violated, the
sentencing court may go no further. The crime cannot constitute a
predicate crime for purposes of the ACCA.49
42

Id. at 577–79.
Id. at 592–93 (defining burglary generically as “independent of the labels employed by the
various States’ criminal codes”); see also id. at 598 (“Although the exact formulations vary, the
generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”).
The Court has not yet generically defined the other enumerated crimes.
44
Id. at 602.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
49
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the restriction on judicial fact-finding for
sentencing purposes since Taylor. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (“[W]e
consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the
residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.”); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491–92 (2000) (striking down a mandatory sentencing enhancement as
unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth Amendment). Because fact-finding by judges, instead of
43
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The categorical approach’s relative simplicity does not appear to have
survived its application to the residual clause. In James v. United States,
the Court addressed whether a Florida conviction for attempted burglary
qualifies as a violent felony.50 Although attempted burglary did not meet
Taylor’s generic definition of burglary for the ACCA, the Court held that it
could still constitute a violent felony under the residual clause.51 In so
holding, however, the Court confused the analysis in two ways. First, it
proposed a broader reading of the residual clause than the canon of
ejusdem generis may allow. It acknowledged that the scope of the residual
clause was limited by the preceding enumerated crimes:
The specific offenses enumerated in clause (ii) provide one
baseline from which to measure whether other similar
conduct “otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of
juries, increased defendants’ sentences, the sentencing scheme at issue in Apprendi violated the right to
trial by jury. Id. The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury of one’s peers find each fact
necessary to the conviction and sentence. Indeed, Apprendi offered this guidance: “Other than the fact
of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. The
Supreme Court extended Apprendi’s key holding to state sentencing guidelines in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), and federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 230–32 (2005), and has affirmed it in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). For the argument that the Sentencing Guidelines violate the
Sixth Amendment, see generally David C. Holman, Note, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker,
Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 271
(2008).
Just as judges cannot rely on facts not found by a jury to increase a mandatory sentence under
Apprendi and Booker, they cannot do so to determine whether a prior conviction is a violent felony.
Apprendi and the categorical approach require judges to use only the fact of the prior conviction and
the specific elements found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Whether a prior conviction is a
“violent felony” is a legal question that would not ordinarily implicate the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right. That inquiry remains a legal question so long as the judge considers only the law. But if the
judge deviates from the categorical approach and considers aspects of the crime not found by the jury,
not admitted by the defendant, or which do not constitute elements of the crime, then that veers into
factual questions and implicates the Sixth Amendment.
Shepard acknowledged Apprendi’s limitation on ACCA fact-finding, distinguishing judicial factfinding of a prior conviction for generic burglary “made on the authority of Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)” from fact-finding of a prior conviction for a non-generic burglary.
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25. A court determining whether a non-generic crime of burglary qualifies as
ACCA burglary will need to resort to the jury instructions or other charging documents. Id. This factfinding
is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and
too much like the findings subject to Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)]
and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve
the dispute. The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks of unconstitutionality,
therefore counsels us to limit the scope of judicial factfinding on the disputed
generic character of a prior plea, just as Taylor constrained judicial findings about
the generic implication of a jury’s verdict.
Id. at 25–26 (internal citation omitted). The Court has acknowledged and limited the danger of judicial
fact-finding that violates the Sixth Amendment. In light of Apprendi and its progeny, the Court could
not forsake the categorical approach in favor of judicial fact-finding regarding the actual conduct
underlying a prior conviction.
50
550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007).
51
Id. at 211–12.
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physical injury.” In this case, we can ask whether the risk
posed by attempted burglary is comparable to that posed by
its closest analog among the enumerated offenses—here,
completed burglary.52
Later, however, the Court stated that crimes falling under the residual
clause must pose a risk comparable, but not necessarily equal, to the risk
posed by the enumerated crimes.53 The Court then appeared to open the
floodgates to all crimes that pose a serious risk, and not just those similar
to the enumerated crimes: “As long as an offense is of a type that, by its
nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, it satisfies the
requirements of [the] residual provision.”54 As Justice Scalia argued in his
dissent, this “almost entirely ad hoc” approach is hardly a model of clear
guidance.55
Second, James muddled the categorical approach, despite its firm
restatement of the Taylor/Shepard language early in the opinion, by
instructing courts for the first time to look beyond the elements of the
statutory offense and consider the “ordinary” commission of the offense.
“We do not view [the categorical] approach as requiring that every
conceivable factual offense covered by a statute must necessarily present a
serious potential risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent
felony.”56 In other words, the statutory elements control, not the facts of
the crime. Someone could peacefully commit a crime, the elements of
which require a serious potential risk of injury, simply by avoiding the
injury. For example, reckless driving, or even arson, presents a serious
potential risk of injury to others, but one can commit it without actually
injuring anyone. A hypothetically peaceful commission of the crime
should not exclude it from the residual clause. Nonetheless, the Court
restated this framework in a troubling fashion: “[T]he proper inquiry is
whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the
ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.”57
This instruction presents two problems. First, a sentencing court has
few tools to determine reliably the “ordinary” commission of a crime.
Without better guidance, courts have tried several approaches, including
52

Id. at 203.
Id. at 209 (arguing that crimes falling under the residual clause need not present “as much risk
as the least dangerous enumerated offense” and “[w]hile it may be reasonable to infer that the risks
presented by the enumerated offenses involve a risk of this magnitude, it does not follow that an
offense that presents a lesser risk necessarily fails to qualify”).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That gets this case off our docket, sure enough. But it utterly
fails to do what this Court is supposed to do: provide guidance concrete enough to ensure that the
ACCA residual provision will be applied with an acceptable degree of consistency . . . .”). Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s dissent.
56
Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
57
Id. (emphasis added).
53
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the use of statistics, applying their “intuitive belief” to hypothesize how
the crime is usually committed, and imagining how the crime could be
committed in the exceptional case.59 Second, the emphasis on the
“ordinary case” threatens to usurp the supposed primacy of the statutory
elements. Of course, these fears could be overblown. One Seventh Circuit
panel has construed James’s “ordinary case” language consistently with
the categorical approach.60 Nonetheless, as another Seventh Circuit panel
demonstrated,61 James provided the temptation for lower courts to consider
more than the mere fact of conviction, the elements of the crime, and the
charging documents.
B. Begay v. United States
Begay v. United States was the Court’s next opportunity to refine its
approach to the residual clause. While Begay provided more guidance than
James did, the opinion raised more questions than it answered. The Begay
Court considered whether three New Mexico convictions for driving under
the influence were violent felonies under the ACCA.62 Returning to a
limited construction of the residual clause, the Court held that the
enumerated crimes limit “the crimes that clause (ii) covers to crimes that
are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the
examples themselves.”63 This language moves away from James’s
potentially broad construction of the residual clause, but it still requires
lower courts to wander through comparisons between the enumerated
crimes and countless state crimes.
Most significantly, Begay held that driving under the influence is not a
violent felony.64 The Court reached this conclusion through its explication
of the “similar[] in kind” requirement: the enumerated crimes in clause (ii)
of the ACCA “all typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’
conduct.”65 DUI statutes, on the other hand, “typically do not insist on
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct; rather, they are, or are most
58

Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009).
See infra Part V.D.2.
60
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As we understand it, this means
that a crime must be categorized as one of violence even if, through some freak chance, the conduct did
not turn out to be violent in an unusual case.”).
61
See infra text accompanying notes 202–10 (discussing United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582
(7th Cir. 2010)).
62
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139–40 (2008). In New Mexico, a DUI becomes a
felony (punishable by imprisonment for more than one year) after the third offense. Begay had a dozen
DUI convictions. Id. at 140.
63
Id. at 143.
64
Id. at 148 (“[A] prior record of DUI, a strict liability crime, differs from a prior record of
violent and aggressive crimes committed intentionally such as arson, burglary, extortion, or crimes
involving the use of explosives. The latter are associated with a likelihood of future violent,
aggressive, and purposeful ‘armed career criminal’ behavior in a way that the former are not.”).
65
Id. at 144–45.
59
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nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict liability . . . .” Begay’s
implicit requirement that crimes falling under the residual clause must
typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct became, for
lower courts, its key holding.67 The Begay Court anchored this new
requirement in its understanding of the underlying purpose of the ACCA:
the prevention of future armed crimes. “As suggested by its title, the
Armed Career Criminal Act focuses upon the special danger created when
a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—
possesses a gun.”68 Purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, the Court
said, “is such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a
gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim. Crimes committed in
such a purposeful, violent, and aggressive manner are ‘potentially more
dangerous when firearms are involved.’”69 In holding that a DUI did not
qualify as a violent crime, the Court noted that a prior conviction of DUI is
not “associated with a likelihood of future violent, aggressive, and
purposeful ‘armed career criminal’ behavior.”70 Begay’s two different
considerations, “purposeful, violent, and aggressive,” and the ACCA’s
concern with a violent felon possessing a firearm, have led lower courts to
results at odds with the categorical approach, as this Article later
demonstrates.71
C. Chambers Continues “Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive”
The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion regarding the residual clause
of the ACCA, Chambers v. United States,72 further confused matters.
Chambers applied Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to an
Illinois conviction for failure to report to a penal institution.73 The Court
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s holding that failure to report poses a “serious
potential risk of physical injury to another” thereby falling under the
residual clause.74 The Court’s application of Begay’s chief test was
unremarkable: “Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of
inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct’
potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property,
66

Id. at 145.
See id. at 144–45 (“The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and
‘aggressive’ conduct.”).
68
Id. at 146.
69
Id. at 144–45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (2006)).
70
Id. at 148.
71
See infra Part IV for a discussion of Begay’s inherent problems.
72
129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (reversing United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Although the Supreme Court issued another ACCA decision in 2010, Johnson v. United States
analyzed a prior conviction under clause (i) of the ACCA and did not discuss the residual clause,
Begay, or Chambers. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2010).
73
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (West. Supp. 2008).
74
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691.
67
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commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain
forms of extortion.”75 The “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” standard
seems to exclude failure to report on its face: the elements of the crime
include a mens rea of “knowingly,” which may equate to “purposeful,” but
they do not suggest violence or aggression.76
But Chambers continued its analysis beyond the simple application of
the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” standard to the elements of failure
to report. The Seventh Circuit had reluctantly followed circuit precedent
and based its holding on the “conjecture as to the possible danger”77 posed
by criminals who fail to report.78 Rather than adhering to a strict
categorical approach that asks only whether the elements of the crime
necessarily involve violent behavior, the Seventh Circuit sought to
determine whether failure to report is statistically likely to be committed in
a violent manner. Begay’s concern with the danger posed by the armed
offender encouraged the Seventh Circuit’s inquiry and the Supreme Court
in Chambers reaffirmed that concern: “The question is whether such an
offender is significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to
resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a ‘serious potential risk of
The Supreme Court then cited a Sentencing
physical injury.’”79
Commission report that surveyed two years of federal sentences involving
failure to report and found that none involved violence.80 The Court used
the study to confirm “the intuitive belief that failure to report does not
involve a serious potential risk of physical injury.”81 This statistical
inquiry drew upon Begay’s understanding of the ACCA’s animating
purpose. While Begay had emphasized the “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” test, Chambers seemed to emphasize a statistical inquiry into
75

Id. at 692.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (“A person convicted of a felony . . . who knowingly fails to
report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails to
return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide by the terms of
home confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.”); Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691–92 (applying the
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct test to the crime of failing to report to a penal institution).
77
United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007).
78
The Seventh Circuit’s Chambers panel, led by Judge Posner, adhered to circuit precedent and
“overwhelming support in the decisions of the other circuits.” Chambers, 473 F.3d at 726. But it did
not do so without protest:
We shall adhere to the precedents for now. But it is an embarrassment to the law
when judges base decisions of consequence on conjectures, in this case a conjecture
as to the possible danger of physical injury posed by criminals who fail to show up
to begin serving their sentences or fail to return from furloughs or to halfway
houses.
Id.
79
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)).
80
The Seventh Circuit in Chambers had urged the U.S. Sentencing Commission to study the
frequency of violence in escapes and failures to report. Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727. By the time the
Supreme Court decided Chambers, the Sentencing Commission had obliged. See infra notes 240–45
and accompanying text.
81
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692.
76
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whether the predicate felony increased the likelihood that the offender
would engage in armed felonies in the future. After Chambers, it is
unclear which test has primacy.
Chambers mentioned the categorical approach only once, in terms of
assessing the correct part of the disjunctive failure to report statute. That
nod toward the categorical approach is a sliver of what had been rote
doctrine only four years ago—that sentencing courts must stick to the fact
of the conviction and charging documents and not consider the facts
underlying the offense. Not merely a complex formula promulgated by the
Supreme Court, the categorical approach protects offenders’ Sixth
Amendment jury trial right by ensuring that their punishment is based on
crimes that they actually committed. After Begay and Chambers, circuit
courts may justifiably wonder if the categorical approach is dead, and
which part of Supreme Court precedent to use in applying the residual
clause of the ACCA. As Justice Alito observed, “each new application of
the residual clause seems to lead us further and further away from the
statutory text.”82
IV. THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN BEGAY
Begay—and later, Chambers—provided lower courts with two
inquiries to determine whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony under
the ACCA’s residual clause. First, the crime must be similar in kind, as
well as degree of risk posed, to the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson,
extortion, and use of explosives.83 “Similar in kind” means, according to
Begay, that the crime must involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
conduct.84 Second, Begay and Chambers suggest that the crime must be of
the kind that makes the offender more likely to use a gun in future crimes
to harm a victim.85 This Article refers to this second consideration as the
“likely shooter” requirement. This section examines the difficulties with
understanding “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” as well as the
requirement that the violent felony evince an increased likelihood that the
offender might deliberately use a gun to harm a victim.
A. The Nebulous “Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive” Test
Requiring that residual clause crimes be “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” presents two problems. The first is Begay’s failure to define

82

Id. at 695 (Alito, J., concurring).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
85
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
83
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This omission

creates problems of classification. It may be easy to tell
when a person’s conduct was violent and aggressive, but
whether a crime of conviction entails such conduct can be
tricky, because it is necessary to think through the many
varieties of behavior within a law’s domain. States did not
write their statutes with Begay in mind.87
While “violent” and “purposeful” are terms used with some frequency
in state and federal statutes, “aggressive” has no commonly used legal
definition.88 Aside from aggressive driving statutes, which delineate very
specific driving actions that make driving legally “aggressive,”89 no other
state statutes appear to define “aggressive.” Nonetheless, some statutes
still employ “aggressive” without defining it.90 Given the varying
definitions of “aggressive,” one could conclude, as the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have, that it is synonymous with “violent.”91 But why would the
Supreme Court add a gratuitous requirement to its Begay holding? Lower
courts may assume that the Court carefully chooses its words. If
“aggressive” has any meaning different from “violent,” however, it is
unclear what additional elements a crime must require in order to be a
violent felony.
The word “purposeful” is used in some state statutes but often without
86
United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Perhaps because it is common sense
that a DUI is not violent or aggressive in an ordinary sense, the Supreme Court did not define those
terms or explain in other than conclusory terms why a DUI was not violent or aggressive.”).
87
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
88
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 160 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The concept of
‘aggressive’ crimes is vague . . . .”).
89
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-8-55(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (defining “aggressive driving” as
committing at least three specific acts, including “[f]ollowing a vehicle too closely,” “[u]nsafe
operation of a vehicle,” and “[u]nsafe stopping or slowing,” among others).
90
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2301 (LexisNexis 2001) (defining “aggressive manner” for the
purposes of a panhandling statute as certain specific actions); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-5(a) (2010)
(discussing a finding of the General Assembly that “minors who play video games are more likely
to . . . [e]xhibit violent, asocial, or aggressive behavior”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2009)
(including the question of “whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner” among factors to consider when determining whether a juvenile should
be tried as an adult); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.18 (2004) (providing that law enforcement may
seize a dog which kills or harms a human “when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner”); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-02(5) (2009) (defining “sexual contact” as certain forms of contact “for the
purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires”).
91
United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that “the ‘violent and
aggressive’ limitation requires only that a residual-clause predicate crime be characterized by
aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence and therefore injury as the enumerated
offenses”); United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We consider it unlikely
that any conduct properly characterized as ‘violent’ could not also be characterized as ‘aggressive.’”).
But see Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59 (“Although [vehicular homicide] is no doubt violent, as a typical
vehicular homicide involves the death of a victim resulting from a forceful collision, it is not
necessarily aggressive, a term that dovetails with purposeful because it involves a degree of intent.”).
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definition. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) lists “purposely” as one of
four types of culpability, along with “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and
“negligently.”93 According to the MPC:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material
element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the
nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.94
While a minority of states have criminal statutes requiring
“purposeful” conduct, all fifty states and the District of Columbia use a
form of “intentional” as a criminal mens rea.95 It is unclear how the terms
92
Eleven states and the District of Columbia appear to use “purposely” or a derivative as criminal
mens rea. This figure is approximate given the search methodology: a search of Westlaw’s state
statutes database (STAT-ALL) for “ti(crim!) & (purposeful purposely “with the purpose” “with
purpose”).” See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-103(b)(1), (b)(1)(2) (2006) (“purposely”), id. § 5-37208(b)(1) (“with the purpose to”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2101 (2001) (“purposely”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 506.120(1) (West 2009) (“with the purpose to”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.111c(c) (2006)
(“with the purpose of”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225.1(3) (2010) (“purposely”); MONT. CODE ANN. §
23-5-161 (2009) (“purposely”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(IV) (2007) (“purposely”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:5-1(a)(1), (a)(3) (2005) (“purposely”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-221.1 (2009) (“with the
purpose of”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.07(A)(2), (A)(5) (West 2010) (“[w]ith purpose to”); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5508(a)(3) (2006) (“purposely”).
93
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a).
94
Id.
95
All fifty states and the District of Columbia appear to use “intentionally” or a derivative as
criminal mens rea. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(1) (2005) (“intentionally”); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.320
(2008) (“with intent to”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10)(a) (2006) (“intentionally”); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-14-2207(a) (2008) (“with intent”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 141(a), (b) (2010) (“intentionally”);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (2000) (“with the intent to”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56
(2007) (“intentionally”); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 253 (2007) (“intentionally”); D.C. CODE § 7627(d) (2008) (“with the intent to”); FLA. STAT. § 934.43(1)(a)–(b) (2006) (“with intent to”); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-2-20(b)(2)–(3), (b)(4) (2003) (“intentionally”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1)(a)–(b), (2)
(1993) (“intentionally”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7011(2) (2006) (“intentionally”); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/12-19(d)(1) (2002) (“intentionally”); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2(b), (d) (2009)
(“intentionally”); IOWA CODE § 716.1 (2003) (“intentionally”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3419(a)(1)
(2009) (“with intent to”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.100(1) (West 2006) (“intentionally”); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:67.12(A) (2010) (“with the intent to”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 57(3)(A)
(2006) (“with the intent”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 8-801(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (“with
intent to”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 13D(a) (2008) (“with intent to”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.110a(2)–(3), (4)(a) (2003) (“with intent to”); MINN. STAT. § 609.855(1)–(2) (2009)
(“intentionally”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-44-19(1) (2006) (“intentionally”); MO. REV. STAT. §
565.225.1(2) (1999) (“with the intent to”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-103(1)–(3) (2008) (“with intent
to”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-519(1)–(5) (2008) (“intentionally”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.800(1) (2009)
(“with the intent to”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:23(I)–(II) (2002) (“with intent to”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:21-25(b)(1) (West 2005) (“with the intent to”); N.M. STAT. § 30-9-12(A) (2004)
(“intentional”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.05 (2010) (“with intent to”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-34.8(b)
(2002) (“intentionally”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01(1) (1997) (“intentionally”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2909.07(A)(6) (West 2010) (“with intent to”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 856.1 (2002)
(“intentionally”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2) (2010) (“with intent to”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
907(a)–(b) (2010) (“with intent to”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-5 (2002) (“with intent to”); S.C. CODE
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differ, if at all. Perhaps there is no difference between the two—the words
are arguably interchangeable, as some state legislatures and courts seem to
assume.96 But if the Court meant to require specific intent, why did it not
use the term “intentional”? The choice is especially mystifying given that
“intentional” is more commonly used in statutes and case law. This
confusion complicates the application of Begay.
The second problem is determining whether the “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive” standard applies to the requisite elements of a crime or the
typical commission of a crime. The Begay Court first introduced the
phrase by stating that the enumerated crimes “all typically involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”97 In this phrasing, the word
“typically” modifies “involve,” which refers to the enumerated crimes.
This suggests that courts are to determine whether residual clause crimes
typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. That
language invites examination into the usual method of committing the
crime. Such an approach creates tension with the categorical approach,
which considers only what the statutory elements require rather than the
typical method of violating the statute. The Court next used the phrase in a
slightly different way: “[S]tatutes that forbid driving under the influence
. . . typically do not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct.”98 In this formulation, “typically” modifies “insist,” which refers
to the various state statutes. This formulation suggests that crimes are only
purposeful, violent, and aggressive if the state statute requires purposeful,
violent, and aggressive conduct. That second formulation more closely
tracks the strict categorical approach set forth in Taylor and Shepard.99 An
example better demonstrates the difference between these two approaches.
Auto theft statutes typically do not insist on, or require, violent and
ANN. § 16-3-656 (2009) (“with intent to”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-4A-1 (2006) (“with the intent
to”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-406(d)(1)(A)–(B), (e)(1) (2006) (“with the intent to”); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (West 2003) (“intentionally”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (West 2008)
(“intentionally”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 12 (2009) (“with intent to”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2308.2:3(I), (J), (M) (2009) (“intentionally”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020(1) (2009) (“with
intent to”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-22-12 (2008) (“with intent to”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.012
(2005) (“intentionally”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a)(ii) (2009) (“intentionally”).
96
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(17) (2008) (“‘Purposely’ or an equivalent term such as
‘purpose’, ‘with purpose’, ‘intentional’, ‘intentionally’, ‘intended’, or ‘with intent to’ means the same
as ‘purposely’ as defined in § 5-2-202.”); id. § 5-2-202(1) (using “purposely” instead of “intentionally”
for the most culpable kind of mens rea); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201(b) (2009) (“Intentional conduct is
conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13C-508(F) (2004)
(“‘[W]illfully’ means purposely or intentionally . . . .”); D.E. v. State, 904 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. App.
2005) (“‘Willful’ means ‘intentional, knowing, and purposeful ’ . . . .”); In re Jerry R., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
155, 160 (Cal. App. 4th. 1994) (“The Legislature’s use of the term ‘willfully’ means that the prohibited
conduct must be performed purposefully or intentionally.”).
97
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotations
marks omitted).
98
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
99
For a discussion of the categorical approach in Taylor and Shepard, see supra text
accompanying notes 41–49.

228

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:209

aggressive conduct. Rather, a few states require only: (1) knowingly or
intentionally, (2) exerting, (3) unauthorized control, (4) over another
person’s vehicle, (5) with intent to deprive.100 Therefore, under the second
formulation, these crimes are not violent felonies. However, under the first
“typically” formulation, one might plausibly argue that auto theft in fact
often involves violent and aggressive conduct. Judge Steven Colloton of
the Eighth Circuit has argued that what begins as auto theft tends to turn
into a dangerous high-speed chase when the police are called and therefore
is “typically” violent and aggressive.101
Even assuming, however, that Begay’s second formulation is the
correct one, that formulation may still sit uneasily with the categorical
approach. If state statutes must “typically insist” on purposeful, violent,
and aggressive conduct, perhaps only a plurality or majority of state
statutes defining a particular crime must require those elements. Rather
than looking to see whether the specific state statute at issue requires
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, lower courts could survey all
state statutes defining the crime and craft a generic definition of the crime,
as the Taylor Court did. The categorical approach, then, would apply to
the typical, generic formulation of the crime. For example, one may be
convicted under a state auto theft statute which requires violent and
aggressive conduct as elements in order to convict. But because the vast
majority of state auto theft statutes do not typically require violent and
aggressive behavior, such a crime may not qualify as “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive” under Begay’s rough formulation. The imprecision of
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” sends lower courts mixed signals, at
best, leading them to varying results.
B. The Rootless “Likely Shooter”
Even once courts decide which formulation of “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive” to adopt, they are not out of the woods yet. The ACCA
imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on felons convicted
of possessing a gun who have three prior convictions for violent felonies,
serious drug offenses, or both. Begay and Chambers suggested, for the
first time, that a prior crime qualifies as a violent felony only if it is the
type of crime that makes it more likely that the criminal will use or possess
a weapon in future crimes.102 Specifically, the Court explained that it was
100
E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.46.360(a) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1802(A), (G) (2010);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2.5(b) (2009).
101
United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
102
See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009) (questioning “whether . . . such an
offender is significantly more likely than others to attack or resist an apprehender, thereby producing a
serious risk of physical injury”); Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.
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especially concerned with violent felonies that “show an increased
likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately
point the gun and pull the trigger.”103 To the Court, the title of the Armed
Career Criminal Act means that the ACCA focuses upon “the special
danger created when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or
drug trafficker—possesses a gun.”104 As support, the Court cited Judge
McConnell’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s Begay decision,105 in which
he wrote, “the legislative history, both originally and in the amendments
relevant to this case, makes clear that the title—the ‘Armed Career
Criminal Act’—was not merely decorative.”106
1. The Judicial and Legislative History of the “Likely Shooter”
Contrary to the Begay Court’s claims, the “likely shooter” inquiry is a
judicial creation without any root in the ACCA or its legislative history.
The ACCA’s title says nothing about whether courts should categorize a
particular crime as a violent felony. Although a statute’s title is a valid
source for statutory interpretation,107 the title of the ACCA is itself
ambiguous as to when the criminal is armed. Under the most natural
reading, the title implies that the Act is concerned with career criminals,
who are currently armed by virtue of the instant felon-in-possession
conviction. Neither the Act’s title nor its text imply that the three previous
violent felonies should be of the type that make the instant felon-inpossession charge—or any other weapon-toting crime—more likely. A
close examination of the legislative history reveals no suggestion that
Congress was primarily concerned with prior violent felonies that create an
increased risk of future armed crime.108 While the three prior felonies may
103

Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.
Id. at 152; see also id. at 147 (stating that certain crimes with mens rea of negligence or
recklessness are “far removed . . . from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with the violent
criminal use of firearms”).
105
Id. at 145 (citing United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 981 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell,
J., dissenting)).
106
Begay, 470 F.3d at 981 n.3 (McConnell, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1159 (1984),
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710).
107
See, e.g., Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (considering the title of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 to determine whether “machinegun” was an element of a new crime or a statutory enhancement).
But see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) (“[A] title alone is not controlling.”); Pa. Dep’t of
Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“‘[T]he title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning
of the text. For interpretive purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous
word or phrase.’” (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29
(1947))).
108
The ACCA’s legislative history suggests that it was meant to be a pure three-strikes recidivist
statute for felons convicted of possession of a firearm. The legislative history reveals only one clear
purpose for the “armed” aspect of the ACCA: the trigger for federal authority. Without the connection
to a conviction for felon in possession, federal courts could not constitutionally punish state crimes
because “purely local activities [are] beyond the reach of federal power.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 9 (2005) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000)); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
104
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increase the likelihood that the offender will commit yet another crime,
only the instant gun-possession conviction, not the three prior felonies,
makes it likely that the offender will use a gun in a future crime.
The Begay Court seemed to acknowledge its extra-textual, policydriven approach: “Were we to read the statute without this distinction, its
15-year mandatory minimum sentence would apply to a host of crimes
which, though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one
normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’”109 In other words, the “likely
shooter” requirement is not drawn from the text of the statute, but was
created by the Court to avoid what it regards as undesirable outcomes, such
as including DUIs as violent felonies. Unfortunately, this attempt to
determine the ACCA’s policy rationale has only further complicated
interpretation of the residual clause.
2. The “Likely Shooter” Conflicts with the Categorical Approach
Not only is the “likely shooter” requirement absent from the title, text,
and legislative history of the ACCA, but it also fits poorly with the
categorical approach. This examination, whether the prior felony entails
conduct that makes it more likely that the criminal will deliberately use a
gun in future crimes, necessarily casts a wider net than the categorical
approach. If a sentencing court were limited to examining the elements of
the previous crime, the likelihood of future armed crime would be an
irrelevant question. The court could consider whether the elements of the
predicate crime require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct without
engaging in the “likely shooter” inquiry. Further, the “likely shooter”
inquiry unmoors the court from both the text of the ACCA and the
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce” and is therefore beyond the reach of federal power).
Senator Specter’s testimony in favor of the 1986 House bill is telling on this point: “The armed
career criminal bill for the first time brings the Federal Government into the fight against street crime
by making it a Federal offense for career criminals to possess a firearm.” Armed Career Criminal
Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 43 (1986) (statement of Sen. Specter). The criminal must first commit the
three predicate violent felonies, qualifying as a career criminal. The subsequent possession of the
firearm then “brings the Federal Government into the fight.” Id. Neither the 1984 ACCA nor the 1986
ACCA were concerned with the criminal who possessed the firearm during the predicate crime. The
firearm component of the law is present only because it opens the door to federal authority under the
Commerce Clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person—who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; . . . to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also Levine, supra note 1, at 547 (2009) (“[T]he desire to
incapacitate career criminals seems to have been the principal motivation for the ACCA. In fact, it
appears that the only reason that the minimum fifteen-year sentence is mandated for illegally
possessing firearms is that imposing the sentence on all career criminals regardless of whether they
were convicted of violating a federal law (such as by illegally possessing a gun) was not a politically
feasible option due to the aforementioned federalism concerns.”).
109
Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.
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“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test for points unknown.
Exacerbating this problem is the lack of a standard to measure the
likelihood—how likely is likely enough? As this Article discusses below,
lower courts struggle with those very questions.
By holding that a DUI does not constitute a violent felony under the
ACCA, the Supreme Court in Begay reached an arguably just result. But
Begay’s ad hoc approach spells trouble for any court trying to understand
its reasoning, and even more trouble for a court trying to follow Begay
while remaining faithful to the Supreme Court’s categorical approach and
the text of the ACCA itself.
V. ISSUES IN BEGAY IMPLEMENTATION
If Begay is problematic on its face, in practice it is downright ugly.
This section discusses four main problems with lower courts’
implementation of Begay. First, by requiring that violent felonies be
“purposeful” as well as violent and aggressive, Begay appeared to require
specific intent for residual clause crimes. Therefore, crimes with a mens
rea of negligence or recklessness cannot qualify as violent felonies even if
those crimes present a serious potential risk of bodily injury. After Begay,
lower courts have obligingly excluded reckless and negligent crimes from
the residual clause. This has led to seemingly absurd results such as a
holding that negligent vehicular homicide is not a “violent felony.”110
Second, Begay has caused a division between the formerly compatible
ACCA and career offender guideline. Because the statutory definitions of
“violent felony” in the ACCA and “crime of violence” in the career
offender guideline are almost identical, federal courts interchangeably
apply the jurisprudence interpreting the two provisions.111 Begay has
called this compatibility into serious doubt. Third, the combination of the
categorical approach and Begay’s requirement that a prior crime be
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” excludes sex crimes against children
that pose a serious potential risk of bodily injury. Fourth, lower courts
have accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to deviate from the
categorical approach and search for the “ordinary case” and the “likely
shooter” using little more than their imaginations, intuitions, and varied use
of statistics.112
A. Specific Intent Is Underinclusive
Begay’s requirement that predicate violent felonies be “purposeful” has
led circuit courts to exclude crimes that appear to fall squarely within the
110

United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2008).
See infra note 141.
112
See supra Part IV.B.
111
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residual clause. Recall that the residual clause of the ACCA includes any
prior felonies involving “a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”113 Begay held that a DUI is not a violent felony because, among
other reasons, DUI statutes “are most nearly comparable to[] crimes that
impose strict liability”114 and “the conduct for which the drunk driver is
convicted need not be purposeful or deliberate.”115 Clearly, Begay means
that strict liability crimes like DUI cannot qualify as violent felonies under
the residual clause.
But what about crimes requiring a mens rea of recklessness or
negligence? By holding that prior crimes must be “purposeful” to fall
under the residual clause, the Court strongly suggested that negligent or
reckless criminal offenses can never qualify. “Purposeful” conduct
typically equates to intentional conduct.116 As examples of crimes that “are
not typically committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career
criminals’” and therefore should not qualify as violent felonies, Begay
offered several state and federal crimes with a mens rea of negligence or
recklessness.117 The selected crimes are a curious list of low-hanging fruit.
Instead of listing crimes of recklessness or negligence that might pose
tougher questions—that is, crimes better characterized as violent felonies
like involuntary manslaughter or reckless endangerment—the Court chose
environmental or consumer crimes that indirectly pose a risk of bodily
injury. These crimes poorly demonstrate the effects of the new, postBegay ACCA; they would not constitute violent felonies even under the
plain language of the ACCA because they do not pose the same or even
comparable risk of potential injury as the enumerated crimes. Its poor
choice of illustrative crimes aside, the Court strongly implied that crimes
of negligence or recklessness cannot be violent felonies.
Many courts of appeals have expressly said what Begay only implied:
violent felonies under the residual clause must require specific intent. The
Seventh Circuit has stated that “crimes with a mens rea of negligence or
recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the
ACCA.”118 Another circuit court’s survey of post-Begay cases from other
113

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) (2006).
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008).
115
Id.
116
See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text
117
Begay, 553 U.S. at 146–47 (“See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2007)
(reckless polluters); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006) (individuals who negligently introduce pollutants
into the sewer system); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (individuals who recklessly tamper with consumer
products); § 1115 (seamen whose inattention to duty causes serious accidents).”).
118
United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Lee, 612
F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although it
is hardly debatable that the elements of felony reckless endangerment in Tennessee present a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another, . . . the offense does not clearly involve the type of
‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ conduct as burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives . . . .
Rather, on its face the statute criminalizes only reckless conduct.” (internal citations omitted) (internal
114
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circuits concluded, “These decisions make clear that when a statute does
not require deliberate or purposeful conduct, a conviction under such a
statute will not be considered a violent felony under the [residual clause of
the] ACCA . . . .”119
This new requirement excludes crimes of negligence or recklessness
that involve “a serious potential risk of bodily injury.”120 Since Begay,
appellate courts have overturned their own precedents holding that certain
dangerous crimes—involuntary manslaughter,121 negligent vehicular
homicide,122 and reckless endangerment123—are violent felonies under the
ACCA or crimes of violence under the career offender guideline.124
Judges of the Seventh Circuit recently clashed over whether
involuntary manslaughter should be classified as a crime of violence.125 In
United States v. Woods, Woods pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter for
dropping and shaking his five-week-old infant son, causing his death.126
The Illinois involuntary manslaughter statute criminalizes reckless acts that
result in an unintentional killing without lawful justification.127
Acknowledging that involuntary manslaughter requires only a mens rea of
recklessness, the Government argued that the intent to commit the act,
even while only “reckless as to the consequences of that act,” was
sufficient to bring a crime of recklessness under the residual clause after
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Begay places
a strong emphasis on intentional—purposeful—conduct as a prerequisite for a crime to be considered
similar in kind to the listed crimes.”).
119
United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 241–42 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing United States v.
Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2008)); Gray, 535 F.3d at 131–32; United States v. Archer, 531
F.3d 1347, 1348–52 (11th Cir. 2008)). Roseboro incorrectly cites Herrick for this proposition. Herrick
held that vehicular homicide’s requisite intent fell below “other crimes that the Begay majority listed as
crimes that do not fall under the residual clause.” Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59. More importantly, Herrick
expressly avoided deciding “whether crimes with a recklessness mens rea could ever come within the
residual clause.” Id. at 60.
120
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) (2006).
121
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 411–12 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that an Illinois
conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not a crime of violence).
122
Herrick, 545 F.3d at 59.
123
United States v. Bishop, No. 08-1950, 2009 WL 2503646, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 2009)
(stating that a Wisconsin conviction for second-degree reckless endangerment is not a crime of
violence); Baker, 559 F.3d at 453; Gray, 535 F.3d at 132.
124
Some of these decisions actually decided whether the crime was a “crime of violence” under
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2009). The definition of “crime of violence” in the
“career offender” guideline is nearly identical to the ACCA, so circuits use ACCA precedent for
section 4B1.2 and vice-versa. For a list of circuit decisions treating the two provisions interchangeably,
see infra note 141.
125
Woods, 576 F.3d at 401, 407. The Seventh Circuit treats “violent felony” under the ACCA
“interchangeably” with “crime of violence” under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2.
Woods, 576 F.3d at 404.
126
Woods, 576 F.3d at 401–02.
127
Id. at 410 (“A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification
commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are
such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them
recklessly.” (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a)).
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Begay.
That creatively expansive take on Begay’s “purposeful”
requirement would make all crimes of recklessness crimes of violence
because “[e]very crime of recklessness necessarily requires a purposeful,
volitional act that sets in motion the later outcome.”129 For example, under
this reasoning, shooting into a crowded room would be purposeful because
one intends to pull the trigger, even though the shooter was only reckless
as to the consequences of the act. Rejecting that argument as inconsistent
with Begay, the court held that crimes of recklessness cannot fall within
the scope of the residual clause and that an Illinois conviction for
involuntary manslaughter is not a crime of violence.130
Woods’s holding met strong resistance from other Seventh Circuit
judges. Because the unanimous Woods panel disagreed with another
panel’s application of the categorical approach, the Seventh Circuit
resolved the dispute by circulating the opinions to the entire court instead
of an en banc hearing.131 The majority of the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the Woods panel, but Judge Easterbrook dissented, joined by Judges Posner
and Tinder.132 The dissenters argued that all homicides are instinctively
purposeful, violent, and aggressive: “How can homicide not be an
intentional, violent, and aggressive act?”133 The Illinois involuntary
manslaughter law’s requirement of an intentional act is sufficiently
purposeful, the dissenters argued, to make it a crime of violence under
Begay. “The possibility that Woods did not intend to drop the child need
not detain us; the state statute requires some knowing conduct, a standard
satisfied by the [intentional] shaking if not the dropping.”134 The criminal
recklessness involved in the Illinois involuntary manslaughter statute “is a
form of intent,” Judge Easterbrook continued, “and I think it likely that the
Justices will deem it sufficient for recidivism enhancements too.”135 After
chipping away at the long-standing distinction between intentional and
reckless, Judge Easterbrook revealed his ultimate purpose—to void
Begay’s “purposeful” requirement. “I grant that recklessness is not
universally equivalent to intent; statutory context matters. But in the main
a violent or aggressive crime that produces injury or death should meet the
Begay standard, even if the actor recklessly ignored the risks to others.”136
128

Id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
130
Id. at 412–13.
131
Id. at 407.
132
Id. at 413 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
133
Id. at 414.
134
Id. at 416.
135
Id. The Second Circuit has held that one affirmative act fulfills Begay’s “purposeful”
requirement. Although sexual assault of a child is a strict liability crime under Vermont law, it
“involves deliberate and affirmative conduct—namely, an intentional sexual act with a person who is,
in fact, under the age of consent—sufficient to satisfy Begay’s observation that violent felonies . . .
typically involve ‘purposeful’ conduct.” United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2009).
136
Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
129
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By this formulation, a crime need not be purposeful to be a crime of
violence, and it can be either violent or aggressive, so long as it is
physically harmful. Judge Easterbrook’s test is compatible with the text of
the residual clause—which includes all crimes that pose a serious potential
risk of physical injury—but he failed to reconcile it with the language of
Begay.
Among the circuits that have considered whether the post-Begay
residual clause requires intentional conduct, only the First Circuit has
avoided holding that it requires intentional conduct.137 Instead of
categorically excluding all crimes of recklessness and negligence, the First
Circuit compared the crime to the other crimes discussed in Begay to
determine whether negligent vehicular homicide constitutes a crime of
violence. Negligent vehicular homicide requires more culpability than
DUI, the court reasoned, but less culpability than the negligent and
reckless environmental crimes that Begay listed as lacking the requisite
intent for a violent felony.138 Thus, the court concluded that negligent
vehicular homicide is not a crime of violence.
A wild imagination is not necessary to hypothesize other, very
dangerous crimes that directly threaten others’ lives and require only
negligence or recklessness. Felony murder is one example.139 Even
though Begay did not actually hold that only specific intent crimes may
constitute violent felonies, its dicta has effected that outcome in the lower
courts.
B. Conflict with the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline
Begay’s statement that only “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
crimes qualify as violent felonies technically applies only to the ACCA.
However, that holding creates tension with the commentary interpreting a
“crime of violence” under the career offender sentencing guideline.
Textually, the two provisions are nearly identical. The only substantial
difference between their texts is that the “crime of violence” definition in
the guideline includes “burglary of a dwelling” as an enumerated crime,
whereas the “violent felony” definition of the ACCA includes mere
“burglary.”140 The career offender guideline, like the ACCA, has a
137
United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (avoiding the decision of “whether
crimes with a recklessness mens rea could ever come within the residual clause”).
138
Id. at 59 (“Although vehicular homicide’s mens rea of criminal negligence under this statute
surpasses that of the DUI at issue in Begay . . . it is below that of other crimes that the Begay majority
listed as crimes that do not fall under the residual clause.”).
139
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) (2007) (“A person is guilty of murder in the first
degree when . . . [w]hile engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes the death of another person.”).
140
Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2009), which states:
The term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law,
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an
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residual clause that includes any crime involving “conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Because the two
provisions are so similar, all circuits have treated the case law regarding
“violent felony” and “crime of violence” as fungible both before141 and
after142 Begay.
Although the texts of the provisions are so similar, the commentary to
the “crime of violence” definition adds a host of crimes to those
enumerated in the guideline itself. The guideline commentary lists murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses,
robbery, extortionate extension of credit, and unlawfully possessing certain
prohibited firearms as crimes of violence, even though they are not

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.
with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006), which states:
[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
141
United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a prior decision
qualifying crime as a “crime of violence” foreclosed argument that crime was not a “violent felony”);
United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the court will look to cases
dealing with “crime of violence” and “violent felony” to interpret the other); United States v. Taylor,
489 F.3d 1112, 1113 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting previous holdings that “crime of violence” cases “provide
important guidance in determining what is a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA”), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 990 (2009); United States v. Spudich, 443 F.3d
986, 987 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that the “same analysis” applies to “crime of violence” and “violent
felony”); United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the court “may
consult cases construing [‘crime of violence’] when considering whether a crime is a ‘violent felony’
under the ACCA”); United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “violent
felony” case law from another circuit is “persuasive authority” to determine whether a similar crime
qualifies as a “crime of violence); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330, 333 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001)
(providing that “violent felony” reasoning “is relevant to determining the meaning of ‘crime of
violence’”); United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir. 2000) (using “violent felony” case
to find that similar crime constituted a “crime of violence”); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593,
594–95 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that “it would be logically inconsistent” for a crime to qualify as a
“crime of violence” and not as a “violent felony”); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating that “crime of violence” and “violent felony” “should be read consistently with each other”);
United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1062 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that “violent felony” cases are
“controlling” when interpreting “crime of violence”), overruled in part by In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d
1085 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that ACCA
precedent is “highly germane authority” for interpreting “crime of violence”).
142
United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084, 1087 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Harris, 586
F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009); Toledo v. United States, 581 F.3d 678, 680 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060,
1068 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Mohr, 554 F.3d 604, 609 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 738 (4th Cir.
2009); In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53,
58 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Billups, 536 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gray,
535 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
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enumerated in the guideline.
Most importantly, the commentary lists
manslaughter as a crime of violence without specifying whether it is
referring to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.144 Nor does the
commentary specify whether manslaughter qualifies as a crime of violence
because it requires the use of force (under subsection (1) of the guideline)
or because it falls under the residual clause of the guideline. Given the
rather broad reach of the ACCA’s residual clause, all the additional crimes
in the guideline commentary could also plausibly fall under the text of the
residual clause—that is, before Begay and its apparent holding that only
“purposeful” crimes constitute violent felonies under the ACCA.
By interpreting the ACCA to include only purposeful crimes, the
Supreme Court in Begay introduced a potential rift between the ACCA and
the career offender guideline. After all, the guideline commentary clearly
states that manslaughter is a crime of violence, even though manslaughter
need not be purposeful. Courts attempting to wrestle with this budding
conflict have taken a variety of approaches.
Courts assume that Begay applies with equal force to the career
offender guideline in spite of the fact that Begay only dealt explicitly with
the ACCA.145 These courts cite their own precedent stating that the two
provisions should be interpreted identically and ignore or explain away the
inclusion of manslaughter in the guideline commentary. Circuits applying
Begay to the career offender guideline exclude crimes of negligence or
recklessness that previously qualified as crimes of violence. The
Wisconsin crime of negligent vehicular homicide “fits neatly” as a crime
of violence within the residual clause because it presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.146 It fit so neatly that the First Circuit
unequivocally declared: “There is no possible formulation of the
Wisconsin motor vehicle homicide statute that would criminalize conduct
that would not constitute a [crime of violence] under the formal categorical
approach to [the] Guidelines.”147 Nonetheless, because the crime does not
fulfill Begay’s purposeful requirement, the court concluded that it cannot
qualify as a crime of violence.148 The same goes for the New York crime
of reckless endangerment.149 Only one appellate decision since Begay has

143
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2009) (listing murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion,
extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, and the unlawful possession of a firearm
described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)). The comment also includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting,
conspiring, and attempting to commit” crimes of violence. Id.
144
Id.
145
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
146
Herrick, 545 F.3d at 57.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 60.
149
United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).
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recognized and respected the definitions’ differences.
As discussed in the previous section, the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Woods held that an Illinois conviction for involuntary
manslaughter did not constitute a crime of violence because it is not
purposeful.151 Treating the ACCA and the career offender guideline
“interchangeably,”152 the Woods court relied entirely on Begay without one
mention of the “crime of violence” commentary. Of course, ACCA case
law should strongly influence the application of the career offender
guideline, especially where the two do not conflict. But Woods needed to
address the apparent conflict between the two: “manslaughter” appears to
include both involuntary and voluntary manslaughter. The Guidelines
commentary cannot be ignored. As the “equivalent of legislative rules
adopted by federal agencies,” they bind federal courts unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the Guidelines.153 The Seventh Circuit
chose Begay, which applies only indirectly to the career offender guideline,
over the guideline’s commentary, which has “controlling weight.”154
The involuntary manslaughter problem calls into doubt the circuits’
application of ACCA case law to the career offender guideline. If
“manslaughter” in the crime of violence commentary includes involuntary
manslaughter, then Begay’s purposeful requirement must not apply to that
crime. And if involuntary manslaughter is exempted from Begay’s
requirement, then perhaps Begay should not apply to the career offender
guideline at all. Several factors point in that direction. First, the Begay
Court never expressly extended its holding to the residual clause of the
career offender guideline. Second, Begay’s “likely shooter” inquiry,
loosely derived from the title of the ACCA, does not apply to the career
offender guideline.155 Third, the apparent inclusion of involuntary
manslaughter in the guideline commentary suggests that crimes of violence
include crimes of recklessness. Including such crimes, as long as they pose
a serious potential risk of physical injury, is perfectly compatible with the
text of the career offender guideline. Therefore, the commentary’s
inclusion of crimes of recklessness should enjoy controlling weight. Judge
Colloton has added another reason why courts should not interchangeably
treat the two provisions—they were “adopted by different bodies at

150

United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1172–75 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that an Arizona
conviction for attempted second-degree burglary qualifies as a crime of violence but not a violent
felony because the guideline commentary expressly includes inchoate offenses).
151
576 F.3d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 2009).
152
Id. at 404.
153
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).
154
Id.
155
United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the career offender
guideline “does not single out armed criminals,” and so “[p]erhaps Begay has broken the link between
§ 924(e) and § 4B1.2”).
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different times.”
Lastly, the advisory nature of the Guidelines after
Booker makes the onerous crime-of-violence determination less necessary.
Even if a sentencing judge determines that a particular prior conviction is
not a crime of violence, the judge still has the discretion to issue a greater
sentence.157 In that light, “elaborate rules . . . that the district judge may
elect to bypass in the end” look foolish.158 Until the significant differences
between the career offender guideline and Begay are reconciled, courts’
application of Begay to the guideline is unnecessary and unfaithful to the
guideline commentary.
C. “Violent” May Exclude Sex Crimes Against Children
Another unintended consequence of Begay is that sex crimes against
children no longer fall under the residual clause in many circuits. Before
Begay, circuit courts repeatedly concluded that sex crimes against minors,
such as sexual assault, statutory rape, and interstate trafficking with the
intent that the minor engage in prostitution, pose a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another. This idea enjoyed such wide acceptance among
the circuits that the Tenth Circuit stated unequivocally in 1998: “Every
published appellate decision which has considered applying the ‘otherwise’
clause in the context of sexual offenses involving minors has found a
‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the minors under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(1)(ii) and has held that the offenses at issue are ‘crimes of
violence.’”159 Courts held that the residual clause even encompassed
convictions where the defendant never actually physically injured the
minor or where the defendant obtained actual consent—because such

156
United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 962 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he statute and the guideline were adopted by different bodies at
different times, . . . the texts of the provisions are not identical, and . . . the Sentencing Commission has
added authoritative commentary to § 4B1.2, which does not apply to § 924(e).” (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.4, cmt. n.1 (2009))); United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964,
969–70 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Guerra, 962 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 870–72 & n.17 (3d
Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
definitions are not identical. The Sentencing Commission was not bound to use for its purposes the
ACCA definition of violent felony. Indeed, it chose to use a different term—crime of violence, rather
than violent felony.”).
157
Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
158
Id. at 418. Nonetheless, district judges must faithfully determine and consider the appropriate
guideline sentence before deciding to exercise discretion and vary from the guideline’s range. See Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (noting that a judge “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented. If he decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must
consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to
support the degree of the variance.”); Holman, supra note 49, at 286 (“[A] sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the judge considered the appropriate factors, correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, and adequately stated his reasons.”).
159
United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998).
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conduct poses a serious potential risk of physical injury.
Courts
reasoned that sexual contact between adults and children creates high risks
of force, physical injury, sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy.161
Begay has changed some circuits’ treatment of sex crimes against
children. Begay held that prior felonies fall within the scope of the residual
clause only if the statutes of conviction require violent and aggressive
conduct.162 Some sex crimes against minors—particularly statutory rape—
do not require violence or aggression, even though they clearly pose a
serious potential risk of physical injury under the plain language of the
residual clause. Reconsidering their prior precedent after Begay, the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that statutory rape is not a violent
felony163: “[B]ecause statutory rape may involve consensual sexual
intercourse, it does not necessarily involve either ‘violent’ or ‘aggressive’
conduct.”164 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that a state conviction for
sexual assault is not a violent felony because the law, which prohibits nine
types of sexual conduct including some consensual encounters, “can result
in convictions for crimes that, while involving purposeful behavior, do not
involve aggressive and violent behavior.”165 The Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits have also revisited their prior precedent after Begay and held that
state convictions for statutory rape fall outside the residual clause because
160

After Begay, the Tenth Circuit held that a state conviction for knowingly taking immodest,
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor did not constitute a crime of violence. United States v.
Dennis, 551 F.3d 986, 991 (10th Cir. 2008). The crime, “which requires a jury assessment based on the
totality of the circumstances and common sense as to whether it has been violated, [does not]
necessarily involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at
990.
161
See United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2005) (including pregnancy,
venereal disease, and physical injury among the risks in child sexual abuse cases); United States v.
Asberry, 394 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting STDs and “physical risks of pregnancy” as risks
from statutory rape). Notably, however, these courts did not substantiate these risks with any statistical
data. Research seems to support the high risk of pregnancy: sixty-nine percent of unmarried adolescent
girls with partners more than six years older become pregnant, 3.7 times the pregnancy rate for the
same population with partners no more than two years older. Denise A. Hines & David Finkelhor,
Statutory Sex Crime Relationships Between Juveniles and Adults: A Review of Social Scientific
Research, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 300, 303 (2007). Further, adolescent girls with older
partners are more likely to contract an STD. Id. at 307. Nonetheless, “these studies are correlational,”
which is to say that the girls’ risky behavior may precede their sexual relationships with older men. Id.
Hines and Finkelhor did not mention high risks of force or physical injury. Still, another study reports:
“Seventy-four percent of women who had intercourse before age 14 and 60% of those who had sex
before age 15 report having had a forced sexual experience.” Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape
Laws Be Effective in Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 30, 30
(1996). Although these figures are not broken down by the age of the sexual partner, they still show
greater incidence of forced sex among young girls.
162
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008).
163
United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Thornton,
554 F.3d 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2009).
164
Christensen, 559 F.3d at 1095 (internal citation omitted).
165
United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2009); see also OHIO REV. CODE §
2907.03 (West 2010) (requiring no elements of aggressive or violent behavior to be found guilty of
sexual battery, a felony of the third degree).
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the crimes are strict liability offenses.
While faithful to the categorical approach and Begay, these results
seem contrary to the text of the ACCA. The ACCA’s residual clause
plainly includes sexual assault as a violent felony, because non-consensual
sexual contact has a serious potential risk of physical injury.167 Similarly,
sexual contact with a minor in the form of statutory rape carries grave risks
of harm, given the high frequency of violence, pregnancy, and STDs, as
well as the underage victim’s diminished capacity for informed consent
and legal inability to consent. Begay creates an end-run around the plain
language of the statute and allows possibly dangerous sexual predators to
avoid a longer prison sentence.168
Other courts have relied on Begay’s “typically” language to
circumvent the categorical approach and conclude that sex crimes against
children constitute violent felonies and crimes of violence.169 Begay’s
“typically” language—along with James’s emphasis on the “ordinary”
case—has allowed courts to expand the inquiry beyond the statutory
elements of the offense and consider how the crime is typically committed.
The Second Circuit took this route in United States v. Daye, explaining,
“Begay does not require that every instance of a particular crime involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”170 Sexual assault of a child is
violent and aggressive, the Daye court said, because “crimes involving
sexual contact between adults and children create a substantial likelihood
of forceful, violent, and aggressive behavior on the part of the perpetrator
because a child has essentially no ability to deter an adult from using such
166
United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1230, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that Florida
conviction for sexual battery of a child under sixteen is not a violent felony under the residual clause
because it is not categorically “purposeful,” despite “presenting a serious potential risk of physical
injury”); United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 813–15 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that Wisconsin
conviction for sexual assault of a child is not a crime of violence after Begay because it is a strict
liability offense).
167
United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that simple rape “could
result in physical injury to the victim,” “is nonetheless a crime against the bodily integrity of the
victim,” and “also subjects the victim to the physical risks associated with sexually transmitted diseases
and pregnancy”). The Ninth Circuit has maintained post-Begay that rape is still a crime of violence,
even though the Arizona sexual assault statute does not require force or coercion. United States v.
Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2010).
168
Of course, Begay may also correct the residual clause’s overbreadth by excluding nondangerous offenders and saving them from an unnecessarily lengthy sentence. The author thanks
Michael O’Hear for this observation. See Shani Fregia, Statutory Rape: A Crime of Violence for
Purposes of Immigrant Deportation?, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 539, 555 (2007) (“[T]reating all statutory
rape offenses in this manner ignores the meaningful variations that exist between cases.”).
169
See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing a federal
conviction for transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage in
prostitution); United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing a Vermont
conviction for sexual abuse of a child); United States v. Wilson, 568 F.3d 670, 671 (8th Cir. 2009)
(discussing a Missouri conviction for child abuse).
170
Daye, 571 F.3d at 234; see also Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674 (“[O]ur inquiry under the residual
clause is focused on whether violent and aggressive conduct is typically involved.”).
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force to coerce the child into a sexual act.” The Eighth Circuit surveyed
reported Missouri court cases regarding convictions for child abuse and
found that each one “clearly involves violent and aggressive conduct.”172
Therefore, the court concluded that child abuse qualified as a violent
felony even though the statute did not require violent or aggressive
conduct, but only a consensual sexual act with a person under the age of
sixteen.173 These cases supplant the requirement that a crime be
necessarily violent and aggressive with the requirement that a crime be
violent and aggressive in its “typical” or likely commission.174 Although
these circuits pay lip service to the categorical approach, this method of
examining the likely commission of a crime contradicts the categorical
approach. As discussed earlier, this problem did not originate with the
circuit courts; rather, Begay’s imprecise instructions created the confusion.
Courts are often caught between a rock and a hard place in applying
Begay to certain prior crimes. Some courts apply the categorical approach
to determine whether the prior crime required purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct. This approach remains faithful to the categorical
approach but often produces unsatisfying results—such as concluding that
sexual assault of a minor is not a crime of violence. Other courts take
advantage of Begay’s “typically” language to circumvent the categorical
approach and reach the more satisfying result—which appears more in line
with the ACCA’s statutory text. These courts must ignore Supreme Court
precedent mandating the categorical approach, or assume that Begay
somehow abrogated it with respect to the residual clause of the ACCA.
D. The Search for the “Ordinary Case” Abandons the Categorical
Approach
1. Growing Tension Between James/Begay/Chambers and
Taylor/Shepard
Lower federal courts now grapple with two nearly contradictory
instructions from the Supreme Court. On the one hand is the categorical
approach as set forth in Taylor and Shepard. According to the categorical
approach, a sentencing court may examine only the fact of the conviction
and the elements of the statutory offense to determine whether a crime is a
“violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA’s residual clause.175 In a few
cases, the defendant may be charged under a statute with disjunctive
elements and the jury is “actually required to find all the elements” of the
171

Daye, 571 F.3d at 234.
Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674.
173
Daye, 571 F.3d at 229 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(3)).
174
See Patterson, 576 F.3d at 442 (holding that transporting a minor in interstate commerce with
intent that the minor engage in prostitution is violent because it creates a “significant risk of violence”).
175
See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
172

2010]

VIOLENT CRIMES AND KNOWN ASSOCIATES

243

crime, including one of the disjunctive elements, in order to convict.176
Only in those rare situations may the court look to the charging documents,
jury instructions, or any plea agreement or colloquy to learn under which
part of the statute the defendant was convicted.177 Besides those narrow
exceptions, which examine only established facts and admissions actually
necessary for the conviction, the categorical approach forbids courts from
examining any other facts underlying the offense.
On the other hand, James, Begay, and Chambers progressively eroded
the categorical approach and encouraged sentencing courts to determine
whether someone could have committed the crime violently. Although
James echoed previous categorical approach instructions,178 it claimed that
the “proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of
the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury
to another.”179 As this Article has discussed, inquiring into the “ordinary
case” likely means looking beyond the elements of the offense and
charging documents. Begay provided two further hints that lower courts
should hypothesize violent means of committing crimes. First, it held that
crimes fall under the ACCA’s residual clause if they “typically” involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, inviting courts to hypothesize
the typical commission of the crime.180 Second, it held that a crime is a
violent felony under the residual clause only if the offender is a likely
shooter181—“the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and
pull the trigger.”182 The likely shooter inquiry encourages yet another
examination of facts beyond the elements of the offense.183
Presumably set free from the categorical approach, circuit courts now
frequently ask whether a particular crime is typically committed violently,
or involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, in “the ordinary
case.” This inquiry takes three slightly different but overlapping forms,
which this Article terms the imaginary ordinary crime exercise, the smell
test, and the statistical perspective.
2. The Great Search for the “Ordinary Case”
a. The Imaginary Ordinary Crime
In order to determine whether a crime is violent and aggressive in the
176

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
See supra note 46–48 and accompanying text for a discussion of restrictions on the court’s
fact-finding.
178
See supra notes 51–57.
179
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (emphasis added). See supra notes 56–57
and accompanying text for a discussion of the “ordinary case” in James.
180
See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text.
182
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).
183
For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the ACCA, see supra Part III.B.
177
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“ordinary case,” courts often employ their collective imaginations to
hypothesize how a crime might play out. In United States v. Billups, the
Seventh Circuit applied Begay to the career offender guideline and the
defendant’s argument that false imprisonment is not a crime of violence
because it can be committed in a non-violent way.184 In Wisconsin, one
may be convicted of false imprisonment for imprisoning another without
his consent.185 But imprisonment “without consent” may be effected in
one of four ways under the statute: by overcoming the non-consenting
victim, by fear through the use or threat of imminent use of physical
violence, purporting to act under legal authority, or by reason of the
victim’s ignorance or mistake of fact or law.186 The first two scenarios
clearly involve some violence or threat of violence.187 But the court found
that the latter two scenarios, in which the perpetrator’s trickery prevents
consent, have sufficient potential for violence because “the victim may
discover” the trickery and resist.188 The court acknowledged that the fourth
method of false imprisonment, by reason of the victim’s ignorance or
mistake of fact or law, could be committed without the risk of violence
where a child victim avoids any physical confrontation.189 Nonetheless,
“that there exists a single possible way, among many, to commit the
offense without posing a serious risk of injury to another does not mean
that, in the ordinary case, the offense does not present such a risk.”190 The
Billups court took the “ordinary case” route to the exclusion of the
categorical approach: instead of only examining the elements of the
offense, which arguably do not require violent conduct, the court imagined
how the offense might play out.191
In United States v. Spells, another Seventh Circuit panel imagined the
ordinary crime. The Spells court addressed whether an Indiana conviction
for resisting law enforcement constitutes a “violent felony” under the
ACCA.192 Under the Indiana statute, one may resist law enforcement by
one of three means: by forcibly resisting a law enforcement officer, by
forcibly resisting service of a process or order from a court, or by fleeing a
law enforcement officer.193
Spells defied the categorical approach in two ways. First, Spells
initially decided whether one of the disjunctive provisions, fleeing law
184

536 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 577 (citing WIS. STAT. § 940.30).
186
Id. at 579 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.22(48)).
187
Id. at 581.
188
Id. (emphasis added).
189
Id.
190
Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
191
Id. at 580–83. The court also applied Begay in passing, finding that “false imprisonment
always involves purposeful behavior and typically involves aggressive, violent behavior.” Id. at 583.
192
United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2008).
193
Id. at 749 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)).
185
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enforcement, is a crime of violence.
But both the categorical
approach195 and Seventh Circuit precedent196 require courts initially to
determine under which disjunctive provision of the statute the defendant
was convicted. Spells unnecessarily reached the merits, because it should
have remanded the case to the district court. Second, in holding that
fleeing an officer qualifies as a violent felony,197 Spells’s application of
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test did not stick to the
statutory elements of the prior conviction. This crime is purposeful
because the statute requires that one “knowingly or intentionally” flee an
officer.198 Fleeing an officer in a vehicle, the court reasoned, is “inherently
aggressive, despite Indiana law’s absence of a requirement that the
conduct endanger others.”199 This is so, the court said, because the officer
will likely give chase thereby endangering himself and others on the
road.200 Further, using Begay’s “likely shooter” inquiry, the court
hypothesized that one fleeing the police may have a firearm, and that such
a person “would have a greater propensity to use that firearm in an effort to
evade arrest.”201 Based only on these hypotheticals and considerations
well beyond the elements of the offense, Spells held that the crime of
fleeing law enforcement qualifies as a violent felony.202
194
Id. at 750 (“Spells claims that the district court failed to properly determine which subsection
of this statute he was convicted under. Whether such a procedural violation occurred is only of
significance if certain Class D felony violations of Indiana’s Resisting Law Enforcement offense would
not constitute a ‘violent felony.’”). Whether fleeing law enforcement is a crime of violence was not
actually the issue before the court until it determined that Spells was convicted under that clause of the
resisting law enforcement statute. Id.
195
See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
196
Spells, 537 F.3d at 749 (stating that the court may consult the charging document, plea
agreement or colloquy or “some comparable judicial record of this information . . . ‘[o]nly where the
statutory elements and the content of the charging document do not resolve whether the crime of
conviction constitutes a [violent felony]’” (quoting United States v. Newbern, 479 F.3d 506, 508 (7th
Cir. 2007))).
197
Id. at 752.
198
Id.
199
Id. (emphasis added). The Indiana statute contemplates but does not require that the offender
use a vehicle. See also IND. CODE 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2009) (stating that a person who knowingly or
intentionally resists law enforcement when he or she “flees from a law enforcement officer after the
officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or
emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop”).
200
Id.
201
Id. Spells also cited Department of Justice statistics for this proposition. See infra V.D.2.c.
202
Three other circuits have concluded that fleeing law enforcement is a violent felony. Citing
Spells for the notion that fleeing law enforcement invites chase, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
West held in conclusory fashion, “[t]here is little doubt that knowingly flaunting the order of a police
officer is aggressive conduct.” 550 F.3d 952, 969 (10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Wise, 597
F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming West and holding that Utah crime of failing to stop at the
command of a police officer was a crime of violence). As for Begay’s violence requirement, the crime
“will typically lead to a confrontation with the officer being disobeyed,” and the likelihood of a chase
increases “the likelihood of serious harm to the officers involved as well as any bystanders that by
happenstance get in the way . . . .” Id. at 970. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits echoed Spells’s and West’s
reasoning: the crime is aggressive because it is a “clear challenge to the officer’s authority and typically
initiates pursuit.” United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Spells, 537 F.3d
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A recent Seventh Circuit panel has reinforced Spells’s hypothetical
approach, despite acknowledging that decision’s faults. In United States v.
Dismuke, the court held that a Wisconsin conviction for vehicular fleeing
qualifies as a violent felony.203 The court could have simply affirmed the
sentence based on Spells because the Indiana crime addressed a sufficiently
similar crime. But in light of more recent case law and Spells’s failure to
“address whether fleeing is ‘violent’ in the way required by Begay,”
Dismuke considered the issue anew.204 First, the court set out its version of
the categorical approach. The Begay test does not apply only to the
elements of the crime, the court reasoned, but rather to the “generic crime
as ordinarily committed” or, to repeat James’s formulation, “the conduct
encompassed by the statutory elements of the crime, in the ordinary or
typical case.”205 Second, the statutory elements of the crime must require a
“purposeful” mens rea. The violent and aggressive requirements, however,
are more flexible, requiring “only that a residual-clause predicate crime be
characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar potential for violence
and therefore injury as the enumerated offenses, not that it must ‘insist on’
or require a violent act.”206 With this reasoning, Dismuke whittled the
Begay test down to one indispensable element (a purposeful mens rea),
effectively eliminated the violent element, and obscured the aggressive
element.
Against these permissive versions of the categorical approach and
Begay, the Wisconsin conviction for vehicular fleeing easily qualified as a
violent felony. Dismuke uncritically adopted the reasoning of Spells and
its progeny, the Tenth Circuit’s West decision, the Fifth Circuit’s Harrimon
decision, and the Sixth Circuit’s United States v. LaCasse207 decision, that
the crime “in the ordinary case” likely leads to a chase.208 The court
briefly distinguished the contrary holding of the Eleventh Circuit209 on the
basis that the Wisconsin statute requires accelerated speed or extinguishing
vehicle lights.210 Although the Minnesota statute at issue in United States
at 752); see also United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2009). It is violent because the
police officer must typically overcome the criminal’s use of force and the criminal will typically
attempt to flee by any means necessary. Young, 580 F.3d at 378; Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 535.
203
593 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2010). Although the Wisconsin vehicular fleeing statute is
divisible, the court determined from the criminal complaint that Dismuke was convicted of
“increas[ing] the speed of the operator’s vehicle or extinguish[ing] the lights of the vehicle in an
attempt to elude or flee” in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3) (2010). Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 590.
204
Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 593. “Wisconsin’s fleeing offense is narrower than Indiana’s, so it is
tempting to simply accept the government’s argument and rely on Spells as subsuming the question
presented here. But in light of an analytical omission we have noted in Spells and intervening
developments in the caselaw, we think the issue calls for independent consideration.” Id. at 592.
205
Id. at 594. This phrasing comes directly from James. See supra note 57.
206
Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 594.
207
567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009).
208
Id. at 591 n.3, 595.
209
United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009).
210
Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 591 n.3.
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211

v. Tyler contained those same requirements, Dismuke avoided engaging
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the crime could not be a violent felony
because its elements do not require a confrontation, chase or violent and
Dismuke’s resolution of Spells’s analytical
aggressive conduct.212
omission is not satisfactory. Despite an impressive windup that diluted the
categorical approach and Begay, the final analysis did not make a more
convincing case that vehicular fleeing is categorically a violent felony.
Instead, the court’s logic mirrored Spells and other circuits’ repetition of
Spells’s reasoning. Ultimately, felons facing sentencing in the Seventh
Circuit for illegally possessing a firearm could still receive a minimum of
fifteen years of imprisonment based on the judicial guess that vehicular
fleeing is violent.213
Certainly, there is nothing grossly unreasonable about these courts’
educated guesses as to how a crime typically plays out. However, the
scenarios depend entirely on the judges’ imaginations, not what is
necessary under the statute to commit the crime. In order to be convicted
of fleeing a law enforcement officer, the criminal need only disobey a
police officer’s order to stop. In some states, a conviction requires even
less. Minnesota’s fleeing statute, for example, “criminalizes conduct that
is neither violent nor aggressive, such as merely ‘extinguish[ing] motor
vehicle headlights or taillights.’”214 Turning off headlights is not
necessarily violent or aggressive except in a world unconnected to the
statute of the prior conviction. Although the Eighth Circuit held that a
Minnesota fleeing conviction is not a crime of violence, the Seventh or
Tenth Circuits could imagine that the mine run of such fleeing convictions
are violent and aggressive, just as those courts did in Spells and West.215
At Begay’s invitation, circuit courts enter this imaginary world apparently
in order to avoid the unsatisfying results required by the categorical
approach.
A recent Eighth Circuit opinion exemplifies the constitutional
problems with the imaginary approach. In United States v. Williams, the
Eighth Circuit held that Missouri convictions for auto theft without consent
and auto tampering are not crimes of violence under the career offender
211

See infra text accompanying note 214.
Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 591 n.3, 596.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in United States v. Sykes, another Seventh Circuit
case affirming Spells and Dismuke, for the October 2010 Term. 598 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 2010 WL 2345244 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010) (No. 09-11311).
214
Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.487 subd. 1 (2009)). Tyler held that a
Minnesota conviction for fleeing a police officer is not a crime of violence. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.
But see United States v. Malloy, Nos. 09-2618, 09-2619, 2010 WL 3061922, at *9–11 (8th Cir. Aug. 6,
2010) (distinguishing the Iowa crime of eluding a pursuing law enforcement officer from the
Minnesota crime of fleeing a police officer at issue in Tyler and holding that the Iowa crime is violent
and aggressive because it requires one to exceed the speed limit by more than twenty-five m.p.h.).
215
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
212
213
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216

guideline.
Auto theft without consent requires only the act of taking
another’s vehicle with the purpose to deprive,217 and tampering “may be
committed by merely receiving, possessing, selling, altering, or defacing
an automobile.”218 Overruling pre-Begay circuit precedent, the panel
concluded that these types of auto theft did not qualify as crimes of
violence because auto theft without consent does not demonstrate a
“proclivity for violence and aggression” similar to auto theft by force, and
auto theft by tampering “includes a range of conduct that is neither violent
nor aggressive.”219 In a dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc, Judge Colloton chastised the panel for unduly overruling preBegay circuit precedent on the issue.220 Quoting pre-Begay case law,
Colloton argued that auto theft without consent is violent not because of its
statutory elements, but because of the “likelihood of confrontation.”221
Once the thief drives away with the vehicle, he is unlawfully
in possession of a potentially deadly or dangerous
weapon . . . . Under the stress and urgency which will
naturally attend his situation, the thief will likely drive
recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with
the potential for serious harm to police or innocent
bystanders.222
This imaginary commission of auto theft is several leaps from what the
Missouri statute actually requires. Judge Colloton’s argument had
persuasive value before Begay because auto theft arguably presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury. But before or after Begay, the
hypothetical crime has never been within the ambit of the categorical
approach. The elements of auto theft do not require dangerous behavior,
much less violent and aggressive behavior. The prosecutor in the prior
case did not have to prove violent and aggressive conduct to obtain a
conviction. The defendant accordingly lacked the opportunity to test the
government’s evidence and offer his own in defense. A jury of the
defendant’s peers did not weigh the evidence and find that the offender
acted with violence or aggression, as would be required by the Sixth
Amendment if violence and aggression were elements of the statutory
offense. When judges impose their own, imaginary version of events, they
rob defendants not only of the protection of the categorical approach but
216

United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 974–76 (8th Cir. 2008).
MO. REV. STAT. § 570.030 (West 1999).
218
Williams, 537 F.3d at 974.
219
Id.
220
United States v. Williams, 546 F.3d 961, 961 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
221
Williams, 546 F.3d at 963.
222
Id.
217
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more importantly their basic constitutional rights.
b. The Smell Test
Rather than engage in these imaginary gymnastics to arrive at the
ordinary commission of a crime, some appellate courts utilize a “smell”
test, much like Justice Potter Stewart’s pornography standard.223 In United
States v. Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit held that a Texas conviction for
possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution qualified as a violent
felony.224 Before Begay, a court could certainly find that possessing a
deadly weapon in prison presents a serious potential risk of physical injury,
as the Tenth Circuit had.225 But Begay forced the Tenth Circuit to consider
whether the “purposeful” requirement, under the categorical approach, bars
a crime requiring mens rea of “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”226
Because one could “recklessly” possess a deadly weapon under the statute,
a strict application of the categorical approach would require a sentencing
court to find that such a crime was not a violent felony. The Zuniga court
did not strictly apply the categorical approach. The statute need not
require purposeful conduct, Zuniga held, citing Begay’s “typically”
language: “It is reasonable to surmise that those who possess deadly
weapons in a penal institution typically intend to possess them.”227 Based
on that conclusory reasoning, the Tenth Circuit held that the offense is
purposeful.228 Notably, the Tenth Circuit had an alternate—and far more
intellectually satisfying—justification for this conclusion. Despite the
statute’s recitation of the word “recklessly,” Texas courts have interpreted
the statute as requiring purposeful possession.229 The court could have
rested its outcome on the judicial construction of the Texas statute, but it
unnecessarily relied on a legally questionable assumption. Adopting
Zuniga’s reasoning, two other circuits have assumed that possession of a
dangerous weapon is necessarily purposeful.230
223
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I know it when I see
it . . . .”).
224
United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 2009).
225
Id. at 1333 (citing United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997)).
226
Id.
227
Id. at 1334 (emphasis added).
228
Id. at 1334–35.
229
Id.
230
In United States v. Polk, the Third Circuit considered whether a federal conviction for
possession of a prohibited object designed to be used as a weapon is a crime of violence. 577 F.3d 515,
520 (3d Cir. 2009). Polk assumed that the strict liability crime was purposeful “in that we may assume
one who possesses a shank intends that possession . . . .” Id. at 519 (emphasis added). Nonetheless,
Polk expressly broke from Zuniga and held that the crime is not a crime of violence because “it cannot
properly be characterized as conduct that is itself aggressive or violent, as only the potential exists for
aggressive or violent conduct.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit followed and expanded Zuniga beyond the prison context to an Arkansas
conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun. United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 827 (8th
Cir. 2009). First, citing Zuniga, Vincent held that “[p]ossession of a dangerous weapon that has no

250

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:209

The Eleventh Circuit used only judicial intuition in United States v.
Harrison to determine that a Florida conviction for willfully fleeing a
police officer is not a violent felony.231 The offense requires only that a
person willfully flee or attempt to elude a law enforcement officer driving
a marked patrol vehicle with sirens and lights activated.232 Based on the
Supreme Court’s direction to determine the “ordinary case,”233 Harrison
said that the court must ascertain how the crime is “ordinarily
committed.”234 Any commission of the offense must be purposeful, given
the statute’s mens rea of “willfully.”235 Addressing Begay’s violence
prong, the court supposed that the disobedience of fleeing “does not always
translate into a serious potential risk of physical injury.”236 Nor does the
crime pass Begay’s “likely shooter” test. If the statute criminalized
“driving away recklessly without regard for the safety of others,” the court
said, “[s]uch callousness and indifference to the lives of others [would]
smack more of the kind of person that might ‘deliberately point the gun
and pull the trigger.’”237 In contrast, willfully fleeing “suggests an
unwillingness to engage in violent conduct . . . . [T]hat kind of person is
not, in our mind, cut from the same cloth as burglars, arsonists,
extortionists, or those that criminally detonate explosives.”238 By using
terms of analysis such as “smack” and “cut from the same cloth,” the court
in Harrison appeared to base its holding on its gut feeling about the crime.
Of the three inquiries, the “smell” test is the most detached from the
categorical approach—a subjective, judicial sense of the crime showing
little regard for the elements of the offense.
c. The Judge as Statistician
Applying a third approach to identify the “ordinary case,” some courts
have used statistics, adding the patina of objectivity to an essentially
lawful purpose creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.” Id. at 825 (citing Zuniga,
553 F.3d at 1334). Vincent’s paltry analysis of “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” was based entirely
on Zuniga. “The Zuniga court reasoned that a statute reaching intentional, knowing, or reckless
conduct could still fall within the ‘otherwise’ clause of § 924(e) because violations of such statutes
‘typically’ involve purposeful conduct.” Id. at 827 (citing Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1334–35). Like the
possession of a sawed-off shotgun, the Vincent court said, the possession of a weapon in prison “is
violent and aggressive because it ‘creates the possibility—even the likelihood—of a future violent
confrontation.’” Id. (quoting Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1335). Vincent offered no support for the holding
that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is necessarily purposeful, violent, and aggressive, other than
Zuniga’s surmise and its conclusory statement that possession of “a weapon with no lawful purpose . . .
is purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” Id.
231
United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009).
232
FLA. STAT. § 316.1935(2) (2006).
233
Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1284–85 (quoting Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 690
(2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)).
234
Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1285.
235
Id. at 1293.
236
Id. at 1294.
237
Id. at 1295 (emphasis added) (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 146).
238
Id. at 1295–96 (emphasis added).
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subjective exercise. Admittedly, as the James Court observed, “serious
potential risk” is an “inherently probabilistic concept.”239 But because
many judges are amateur statisticians, they are likely to misapply statistics.
The most basic problem with this use of statistics, though, is that no one
knows what to measure. Even if used accurately, the chosen metric for the
“ordinary case” shifts from judge to judge. Both the Supreme Court and
the circuit courts have demonstrated the dangers of the statistical approach.
The Supreme Court’s use of “conclusive” statistics in Chambers was
approximate at best.240 To determine whether those who commit the crime
of failure to report to a penal institution are likely shooters, Chambers
utilized a Sentencing Commission report detailing the frequency of a
criminal’s violence while escaping or failing to report to a penal
institution.241 The Sentencing Commission had drafted the report at the
suggestion of the Seventh Circuit panel in Chambers.242 Analyzing the
previous two years, the Commission identified federal cases in which the
defendant received the sentencing guideline enhancement for “Escape,
Instigating or Assisting Escape.”243 After identifying 414 such cases, the
Commission then examined whether the escape was committed with force
or a dangerous weapon or whether the escape caused anyone injury.244
Such a measurement, of course, excludes any violent offenders who
benefited from prosecutorial discretion or were convicted in state court.
Nonetheless, because none of the catalogued “failure to report” offenses in
the previous two years involved violence, Chambers concluded that the
crime did not constitute a “violent felony.”245
Following this statistical approach, the law categorizes crimes as
violent felonies depending on how most criminals actually commit them.
If the use of violence in commission of a particular crime significantly
increased over a two-year period, the law categorizing that crime could
change just as quickly. This approach and its small sample size create
more problems. Courts could never rely on past precedent but would have
to reassess continually whether a crime had become—or ceased to be—a
violent felony, depending on how felons in recent years had chosen to
commit that particular crime. Constant statistical reassessment would raise
questions regarding the standard of review. Now, courts review the
239

James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 207 (2007).
Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009).
241
Id. (“The question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than others to
attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a ‘serious potential risk of physical
injury.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006))).
242
Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727.
243
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2P1.1).
244
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE OFFENSES IN FISCAL YEARS 2006
AND 2007, 6 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/escape_FY0607_final.pdf.
245
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692–93.
240
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determination of whether a crime constitutes a violent felony under the
ACCA de novo, as a matter of law. But to the extent that statistics form
the factual basis for the legal conclusion, appellate courts might owe some
deference to the district court’s statistical findings. On the other hand,
many months could pass between sentencing and appellate review, enough
time for new and different statistics to develop. If the violent felony
determination is legal, perhaps the appellate courts should consider those
new statistics de novo. The mixed legal/factual nature of and the constant
developments surrounding any statistical analysis may complicate an
already onerous task. A sample size larger than the two-year period
analyzed in Chambers would likely stabilize the statistics of particular
crimes and alleviate many of these burdens.
The Seventh Circuit has demonstrated a particular affinity for the
statistical approach. Its decision in Spells246 used—or rather, misused—
statistics to conclude that one who flees law enforcement is a likely
shooter. The court employed Department of Justice statistics showing that
one in four “inmates convicted for brandishing or displaying a firearm[]
had used the gun in this manner . . . to get away.”247 Somehow, Spells
completely inverted that statistic, claiming that the statistic indicated the
offender’s increased “propensity to use that firearm in an effort to evade
arrest.”248 The statistic refers to the number of criminals convicted of
brandishing a firearm who had used that firearm to “get away” from law
enforcement in one way or another. It says nothing about the frequency of
criminals convicted of fleeing law enforcement who brandished a firearm.
Spells misconstrued the statistic another way: Begay asked whether the
prior offense is violent, not necessarily whether the prior offense involved
a firearm. The presence of one does not necessarily lead to the presence of
another. Still, that distorted evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
the crime is a violent felony.249
Another post-Begay decision from the Seventh Circuit, United States v.
Templeton, strongly favored the use of statistics in discerning whether a
crime is a crime of violence under the career offender guideline.250 Before
applying Begay, the court examined the risk of physical injury in
Wisconsin convictions for escape and failure to report.251 The defendant
246

United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 752 (internal quotations marks omitted).
248
Id.
249
Id. at 752–53 (“This link between using a vehicle to flee an officer, and that same individual’s
likelihood of using a gun when fleeing in the future, distinguishes this crime from those listed by the
Court in Begay as being ‘dangerous,’ but not reflective of someone ‘whom one normally labels [an]
armed career criminal[].’” (alteration in Spells) (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146
(2008))).
250
543 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a statute inquires into risk, data trump judicial
guesses.”).
251
Id. at 381–82.
247
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presented statistics showing that these crimes entailed violence only eleven
percent to fifteen percent of the time.252 That figure was based on the
indictments of those convicted of failure to report and escape and whether
they were also “charged under one of four statutes punishing some form of
resisting arrest . . . .”253 The more relevant question, for purposes of the
categorical approach, is whether the defendants were also convicted of
resisting arrest. Templeton acknowledged that an indictment alleging
“forceful resistance to arrest does not establish that violence occurred.”254
Nonetheless, an eleven percent to fifteen percent incidence of injury is
“serious,” the court said, relying on precedent that even “a 2% incidence of
injury from a crime renders the risk ‘serious.’”255 More reliable statistics,
however, showed that violence occurred during escapes between 2.7% and
eight percent of the time.256 Even that low frequency, the court said, is a
“sufficient risk of injury” for escape to count as a crime of violence.257
Once the court established the risk of violence, a necessary but not
sufficient condition of a violent felony, it applied Begay.258 Both escape
and failure to report are purposeful and could be committed in violent or
nonviolent ways, though neither crime requires violence or aggression.
Failure to report is certainly not a violent felony, the court quickly held,259
but escape may be.260 The difference between the court’s treatments of the
two crimes, it appears, is the slight statistical likelihood of violence of
escape, even though the court did not present any comparable statistics on
failure to report. Because of that small likelihood, the court remanded so
that the district court could “determine in what way the defendant
committed the offense.”261
Templeton exemplified the pitfalls of the statistical approach, even
where judges use statistics accurately. Goalposts move, depending on the
court or the judge. How violent is violent? For some judges on the
252

Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 382.
255
Id. at 381.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 382.
259
Id. at 383 (“A walkaway is not a crime of violence under Begay. Nor is a simple failure to
report to custody . . . .”).
260
Id. at 382 (“Escapes that entail violence . . . involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct.” (internal quotations marks omitted)) .
261
Id. at 384. The statistical approach has its detractors. Another Seventh Circuit panel, in
United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2009), doubted that statistics can help determine whether
a crime is necessarily violent. The Hart court held that a conviction for the federal crime of escape is
not a crime of violence because “one can commit escape under the federal statute without putting
oneself, or anyone else, in harm’s way.” Id. at 681. Chambers did not establish that “there is some
statistical cutoff separating violent from non-violent crimes . . . .” Id. Rather, the statistics in
Chambers merely “elucidate the difficulties inherent in attempting to ascribe a single violent or nonviolent ‘nature’ to crimes committed under such a broadly applicable statute.” Id.
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Seventh Circuit, a two percent incidence of violence during the
commission of a particular crime demonstrates that the crime is legally
violent. The placement of that line seems arbitrary. If an incidence as low
as two percent is violent, then perhaps any likelihood greater than zero will
qualify the crime as legally violent. Courts may use statistics to confirm
“intuitive” beliefs that a crime is violent or not.262 As Judge Alex Kozinski
recently wrote, there is no basis in the law for determining whether “most
of the cases” involve dangerous conduct: “Don’t even think about how a
court is supposed to figure out whether a statute is applied in a certain way
‘most of the time.’ (A statistical analysis of the state reporter? A survey?
Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?)”263
Without any standards, the statistical approach is a dressed-up version
of the imaginary ordinary crime approach and the smell test. Ultimately,
they are all subjective inquiries that guesstimate the violence of crimes
whose elements do not require violent conduct. These methods clearly
conflict with the categorical approach. Further, under this method, the
ACCA and its definition of “violent felony” lack independent meaning—
they change according to criminals’ behavior from one year to the next.
And the law varies even more widely depending on a court’s chosen
metric. Such a capricious method of statutory interpretation cannot
adequately place offenders on notice of which actions trigger the ACCA
and its fifteen-year minimum sentence or the career offender guideline and
its sixteen-level sentencing enhancement.
VI. RECONCILING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, BEGAY, AND THE TEXT
OF THE ACCA
Lower courts interpreting the ACCA’s residual clause face a difficult
task: reconciling the statutory text, the categorical approach, and Begay’s
requirement that the crimes be “typically” purposeful, violent, and
aggressive. This Article has presented three major problems with the postBegay application of the residual clause. First, James and Begay supplied
the tools to deviate from the categorical approach. James’s “ordinary
case” language, Begay’s invitation to examine how an offense is
“typically” committed, and Begay’s likely shooter consideration create
room for courts to look beyond the statutory elements of the prior
conviction. Second, Begay created the temptation to deviate from the
categorical approach. If courts strictly apply the categorical approach and
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, they are forced
262
Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 692 (2009) (“The upshot is that the study strongly
supports the intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a serious potential risk of physical
injury.”).
263
United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
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to exclude crimes involving conduct that clearly presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury. The “purposeful” requirement seems to
exclude some seriously risky crimes of negligence and recklessness, and
creates tension with the career offender sentencing guideline. The
“violent” requirement excludes many sex crimes against children. Lower
courts are placed in the unenviable position of holding that seriously risky
crimes are not violent felonies. Third, some lower courts are using the
supplied tools to deviate from the categorical approach or to ignore some
or all of Begay’s key holding.
The status quo is untenable. Given wide latitude by Begay’s
ambiguous instructions, some lower courts actively circumvent the
categorical approach to avoid a strict application of Begay’s “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive” test and include crimes that clearly present a
serious risk of physical injury. These courts need a new framework that
includes more of these crimes while faithfully applying Begay and the
categorical approach.
A new framework that addresses most of Begay’s problems is
available. An examination of the alternative paths separates the better
practices from the poor practices. After Begay, lower courts can choose
from a few different combinations of the categorical approach and Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement. A court could apply the
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to the statutory elements of the
prior convictions strictly following the categorical approach. By ignoring
the “ordinary case,” this path excludes some crimes that should plainly
qualify under the text of the residual clause, like negligent vehicular
homicide in United States v. Gray264 and sexual assault in United States v.
Wynn.265 The other options dilute either the categorical approach or the
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement. One option is to apply
the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement to the “typical” or
“ordinary case,” effectively ignoring the categorical approach. This path
includes more crimes that should qualify under the text of the residual
clause, like fleeing law enforcement in United States v. West.266 The third
option is to apply a diluted “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
requirement (by ignoring some elements or disregarding it altogether)
while strictly following the categorical approach. Judge Easterbrook’s
dissent in Woods exemplifies this option, which would also include more
crimes that qualify under the text of the residual clause.267
264

535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
579 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009). For a discussion of the residual clause and crimes of sexual
assault, see supra Part V.C.
266
550 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2008); see also supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing
appellate courts’ treatment of the crime of fleeing law enforcement under the residual clause).
267
See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s dissent
in Woods.
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A fourth option, exemplified by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Dismuke,268 deserves an especially close look. As
discussed above, Dismuke held that a Wisconsin conviction for vehicular
fleeing is a violent felony, based on Spells and its progeny from other
circuits.269 Leading up to that basic holding, though, the court laid out a
framework that diluted both the categorical approach and Begay’s test by
relying on the Supreme Court’s “typically” and “ordinary case” language.
Not “every conceivable violation of the statute [of the offense must] meet
the Begay test.”270 Instead, the court examined “the conduct encompassed
by the statutory elements of the crime, in the ordinary or typical
case . . . .”271 By this rendering of the categorical approach, Begay applies
to the ordinary commission of the crime as the court imagines it.
Turning to the impact of Begay, Dismuke minimized the “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive” requirement more than any other appellate court to
date. First, the court emphasized Begay’s holding that a residual clause
crime must present a risk of injury similar in kind and degree to the
enumerated crimes.272 Second, Dismuke treated “purposeful” as a hardand-fast element of Begay’s test, but regarded “violent and aggressive” as
much more flexible. The court argued that residual clause crimes must
have a mens rea of “purposeful” or “intentional” conduct because all of the
enumerated crimes are purposeful.273 But that statement is not accurate:
“crimes involving the use of explosives” may not require any mens rea, as
Justice Scalia pointed out in his Begay concurrence.274 Begay’s “violent
and aggressive” requirement, though, is less demanding in the eyes of the
Dismuke court because the enumerated crimes do not “invariably involve
acts of violence.”275 Rather, “violent and aggressive” is merely “a
descriptive phrase,” characterizing the crimes’ common “aggressive
conduct that carries the genuine potential for violence.”276 Therefore, “the
‘violent and aggressive’ limitation requires only that a residual-clause
predicate crime be characterized by aggressive conduct with a similar
potential for violence.”277 In the aggregate, these dilutions of Begay
require only purposeful mens rea and that the statutory elements of the
crime be “encompassed” by aggressive conduct with a potential for
violence similar to that of the enumerated crimes.
Although Dismuke thoroughly analyzed Begay in light of the ACCA’s
268

United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 596.
270
Id. at 594.
271
Id. (emphasis added).
272
Id. at 591–92.
273
Id. at 592.
274
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 158 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 594.
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Id.
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Id.
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text, its approach still suffers from a glaring inconsistency with Supreme
Court precedent: it plainly examines information beyond “‘the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’”278 With each
careful step, Dismuke narrowed Begay to require only a “purposeful” mens
rea. The remainder of Begay’s test, “violent and aggressive,” is so
weakened that a court can effectively ignore “violent” and focus on the
presence of what it deems to be “aggressive” conduct, even though the
government never had to prove such an element to convict. Admittedly,
the Dismuke court had to pick through the Supreme Court’s conflicting
signals and choose a reasonable path. And the court largely succeeded.
Vehicular fleeing seems like a violent felony according to the text of the
residual clause, and the “typically” and “ordinary case” language from
Begay and James support a diluted categorical approach.
But the categorical approach is the one aspect of ACCA jurisprudence
that should not yield, given its grounding in the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial,279 even if that means excluding some extremely risky crimes.
All four of the outlined paths carry the same disadvantage: minimizing or
disregarding an aspect of the Supreme Court’s ACCA precedent. The
question is which solution both faithfully adheres to precedent, and
includes as many crimes as possible that qualify as violent felonies under
the plain text of the residual clause (crimes involving conduct that presents
a serious risk of potential injury to another). Such a solution must give the
categorical approach priority over other strains of the Supreme Court’s
ACCA precedent. The categorical approach has major drawbacks. Its
complex steps can easily trip up a court examining the statutory elements
of a conviction, especially when the statute contains disjunctive elements,
and its inflexibility may not accommodate statutes not written with the
ACCA or Begay’s three-part test in mind.280 But basic principles of
fairness and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial mandate that
sentencing courts consider only the legal elements and admissions of the
prior conviction, not hypothetical visions of that crime. Given the
significant ambiguity still surrounding the residual clause even after a
series of Supreme Court decisions and scores of appellate decisions, the

278
279

ACCA.

Id. at 589 (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005)).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the categorical approach and the

280
A strict categorical approach would also minimize the courts’ time spent analyzing crimes:
either the crime’s statutory elements contain the necessarily elements or not. The “ordinary case”
approach, in contrast, tends to require much more thought and labor; however, some courts simply state
that the crime increases the likelihood of a confrontation without any further analysis. See United
States v. Patillar, 595 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (claiming that the conduct underlying the crime
of larceny from the person “is violent and aggressive because it creates a significant risk of
confrontation between thief and victim”).
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law should err on the side of lenity to the defendant.
Therefore, when
forced to choose between the categorical approach and Begay, courts
should strictly follow the categorical approach and, if necessary, minimize
aspects of Begay.
With these principles in mind, courts should disregard the ACCA
precedent most at odds with the categorical approach: Begay’s “typically”
language and James’s “ordinary case.” Defining the scope of the residual
clause by comparison to the enumerated crimes, Begay argued that the
enumerated crimes all “typically involve” purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct. Elsewhere, Begay excluded a DUI as a violent felony
because “statutes that forbid driving under the influence . . . typically do
not insist on purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” As explained
above, the typical or ordinary commission of a crime is simply beyond the
scope of the statutory elements required to convict a person for a crime.
The “likely shooter” consideration from Begay should suffer the same
fate. Begay’s claim that purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct “is
such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will
use that gun deliberately to harm a victim” merely illustrated its central
test. Contrary to the Court’s claim, the consideration is a judicial
innovation rather than rooted in the statute’s title or text.282 Begay’s
outcome did not turn on DUI’s incompatibility with that consideration.
Therefore, courts should regard the “likely shooter” as descriptive dicta,
which they are free to disregard in future cases. Further, the consideration
invites an imaginative application of the residual clause: could the court
imagine an auto thief or a shoplifter using a gun to harm a victim in a later
crime? That question is likewise unrelated to the statutory elements of
which the defendant was actually convicted.
With the categorical approach as the lodestar, the only way to include
more crimes that qualify as violent felonies under the plain text of the
residual clause is to disregard the non-binding aspects of Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test. The apparent mandate that
residual clause crimes require “purposeful” conduct is the weakest and
most problematic part of Begay’s three-part test. Begay applied its test to a
strict liability crime, a New Mexico DUI conviction. Begay only implied
that crimes of recklessness and negligence cannot qualify as residual clause
crimes without actually addressing any such crimes. Therefore, the only
rationale actually necessary to Begay’s result is that strict liability crimes
281
“Where it is reasonably avoidable, such indeterminateness is unacceptable in the context of
criminal sanctions. The rule of lenity, grounded in part on the need to give ‘fair warning’ of what is
encompassed by a criminal statute, demands that we give this text the more narrow reading of which it
is susceptible.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 219 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
282
See supra Part III.B.

2010]

VIOLENT CRIMES AND KNOWN ASSOCIATES

259

283

are not violent felonies under the residual clause.
Since Begay, the
Court has not had the occasion to extend the “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” test to crimes of recklessness and negligence. Therefore,
language purporting to require intentional conduct should be considered
dicta.284 Nothing in the text of the ACCA provides any reason to limit the
residual clause to intentional crimes. Moreover, if the residual clause is
defined by the characteristics of the preceding enumerated crimes, it is
notable that one of those crimes, use of explosives, “may involve merely
negligent or reckless conduct.”285 Furthermore, by including all crimes
that pose a “serious potential risk of injury,” the residual clause plainly
includes seriously dangerous crimes of negligence or recklessness.
As discussed above, Judge Easterbrook has offered another way to
reconcile the categorical approach and Begay’s apparent “purposeful”
requirement.286 In Woods, Judge Easterbrook argued that intent as to a
requisite act, instead of the natural consequences of the act, is sufficiently
purposeful to qualify as a violent felony under Begay. This argument’s
greatest attraction is that it avoids ignoring a fairly clear direction (the
“purposeful” requirement) from the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it may
be too clever by half. A mens rea of “purposely” usually requires that the
offender intended a certain nature of conduct or the natural consequences
of the act.287 The Indiana involuntary manslaughter statute at issue in
Woods clearly did not qualify under the common concept of a purposeful
mens rea. The statute’s mens rea pertains only to the unintentional
killing.288 Because the Indiana involuntary manslaughter statute obviously
required reckless, not purposeful, conduct, Judge Easterbrook’s argument
requires a unique definition of mens rea for the ACCA and the career
offender guideline and another definition of mens rea for the rest of
criminal law. Such a maneuver, while helpful to this present problem,
283

See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996) (“We adhere . . . not to mere
obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its
earlier decisions. When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions
of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”).
285
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 152 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
286
See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s dissent
in Woods.
287
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of
an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes
or hopes that they exist.”); see also Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 456 (2006) (“[T]he mens rea of conscious purpose requires that the
defendant understand and intend the probable consequences of his actions.”).
288
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a) (2010) (“A person who unintentionally kills an individual
without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful
which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and
he performs them recklessly . . . . ” (emphasis added)).
284
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turns the statute on its head and casts doubt on all statutes utilizing the
common language of mens rea.
Reading Begay as still including crimes of negligence or recklessness
would give effect to the text of the ACCA and common sense rather than
non-binding dicta.
Crimes like involuntary manslaughter, reckless
endangerment, and negligent vehicular homicide would again qualify as
violent felonies under the residual clause. This interpretation would also
resolve most of the tension between the ACCA and the career offender
guideline. If crimes of violence are not limited to purposeful crimes, then
courts can give the guideline’s commentary its due and controlling weight.
Begay’s requirements that a residual clause crime be categorically
violent and aggressive are not so easily neglected. The two requirements
may have constituted dicta at the time of Begay because they were not
necessary to the outcome of the case. The Court could have disposed of
the case based only on the strict liability of the New Mexico DUI statute.
But if the requirements were dicta after Begay, Chambers eliminated that
possibility. Chambers held that a prior Illinois conviction for failure to
report did not qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause.289 The
statute at issue in Chambers required knowing conduct,290 so the Court
could not dispose of the case on the same grounds as in Begay. Rather, the
crime failed to qualify for lack of violent conduct: “[A]n individual who
fails to report would seem unlikely . . . to call attention to his whereabouts
by simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct.”291
Though the Court’s discussion of likelihoods did not exemplify the
categorical approach, Chambers certainly turned on the lack of violent
conduct. After Chambers, only crimes that require violent conduct may
qualify as violent felonies.
The impact of Begay’s “aggressive” requirement is still unclear.
Chambers addressed the lack of aggressive conduct in the crime of failure
to report just once in the opinion: “The behavior that likely underlies a
failure to report would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm
than the less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from
custody.”292 Although this comparison between failure to report and
escape from custody may be correct as an “intuitive belief,”293 the Illinois
statute does not actually require aggressive conduct for either crime.
Neither Begay nor Chambers distinguished the aggressive requirement
289

Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 693 (2009).
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (2010) (“A person convicted of a felony . . . who
knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or
knowingly fails to return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide
by the terms of home confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” (emphasis added)).
291
Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692.
292
Id. at 691.
293
Id. at 692.
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from the violent requirement. Perhaps “aggressive” was a mere rhetorical
flourish, not significantly different from “violent.” Without further
direction or any common criminal law definition for “aggressive,” courts
may safely assume that crimes that require violent conduct also satisfy
Begay’s “aggressive” requirement.294
Of Begay’s “violent and aggressive” requirements, only “violent” is
essential to crimes falling under the residual clause of the ACCA. While
this narrow reading of Begay includes many more crimes that pose a
serious potential risk of physical injury, it carries two major disadvantages.
First, if the residual clause includes only crimes with a statutory element of
violence, such a reading arguably renders the residual clause superfluous
because clause (i) of the “violent felony” definition already encompasses
elements involving the use or threat of force. Nonetheless, the residual
clause is still broader than clause (i) because it also includes the “risk” of
violence. Second, this framework still excludes many sex crimes against
children that do not require violent conduct even though the text of the
residual clause arguably includes sex crimes against children.295 But both
of these disadvantages spring from Begay, rather than this framework.
Begay has effectively superceded the statutory text, requiring violence
instead of only the serious risk of violence. Lower courts should not
consider hypothetical conduct outside the statutory elements of the prior
conviction, even if this reading creates a statutory redundancy and fails to
include many crimes that pose a serious potential risk of bodily injury.
The hands of lower courts are tied until the Supreme Court reconsiders or
recasts Begay, or Congress amends the ACCA.
Courts should limit the residual clause inquiry to the fact of the
conviction and the elements of the offense. From that information, the
court should determine whether the statute requires conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury: violent conduct that is committed
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally. If the statute of conviction is
disjunctive, the court should examine the indictment, other charging
documents, or any plea agreement or colloquy “‘only to determine which
part of the statute the defendant violated.’”296 If neither the statute nor the
charging documents indicate that the elements of the defendant’s crime of
conviction required violence, then the court should not include the offense
as a violent felony. The court should limit its inquiry to these facts and
documents. It should not investigate the defendant’s uncharged conduct or
speculate on the possibility that she could violently commit the crime.
294
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the “aggressive”
requirement.
295
See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of the “violent” requirement excluding sex crimes against
children.
296
United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Howell,
531 F.3d 621, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2008)).

262

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:209

Imagine that the federal sentencing court had applied this approach to
the case of Melvin Spells and his prior conviction for fleeing law
enforcement. A person can violate the Indiana statute in a number of
ways. Mr. Spells was convicted of the Class D felony version, which
required that he used a vehicle to commit the offense or committed it in a
The sentencing court should have initially
dangerous manner.297
determined under which subsection he was convicted, using the
indictment, other charging documents, or any plea agreement or colloquy,
instead of the probable cause affidavit.298 If those documents did not
clarify which crime the defendant committed, the categorical approach
inquiry would normally end and the crime could not qualify as a violent
felony.299 But if the documents showed that Mr. Spells was convicted of
using a vehicle to resist law enforcement, it would then decide whether that
crime is categorically violent—whether the statutory elements included
violence and a mens rea of at least negligence. The statute requires at least
knowing or intentional conduct, so Begay’s prohibition of strict liability
crimes does not disqualify it. But the statute does not require violent
conduct, so it should not have qualified as a violent felony under the
residual clause.
The hypothetical treatment of Mr. Spells’s case demonstrates both the
costs and benefits of this Article’s proposal. The costs are mostly policybased. The complex categorical approach burdens and confuses courts.
The crime of resisting law enforcement in a vehicle seems like it “presents
a serious potential risk of bodily injury.”300 But these costs are worth
bearing in light of the chief benefit: punishing a defendant based only on
facts that the government actually had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
to secure a conviction, rather than based on the court’s imagination.

297
United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2008). The offense of fleeing law
enforcement is a
Class D felony if: (A) . . . the person uses a vehicle to commit the offense; or (B) . . .
the person draws or uses a deadly weapon, inflicts bodily injury on or otherwise
causes bodily injury to another person, or operates a vehicle in a manner that creates
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person.
Id. at 749–50 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(b)).
298
See id. at 748–50 (listing the procedures a court must follow in determining whether a crime
constitutes a violent felony).
299
The Seventh Circuit incorrectly skipped this step. The sentencing court procedurally erred by
consulting the probable cause affidavit to determine whether Mr. Spells used a vehicle to flee law
enforcement. Id. at 745–46, 750. “Whether such a procedural violation occurred is only of
significance if certain Class D felony violations of Indiana’s Resisting Law Enforcement offense would
not constitute a ‘violent felony.’” Id. at 750. The court went on to decide whether using a vehicle to
flee law enforcement is a violent felony, even though it was not clear whether Mr. Spells committed
that crime. Id.
300
Id. at 748 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Consistency, fairness to the defendant, faithfulness to the text of the
ACCA, and adherence to Supreme Court precedent all point toward the
strict categorical approach and reading Begay as requiring that the residual
clause crimes include statutory elements of “violence.” Congress and the
Supreme Court bear the most responsibility for the confusion surrounding
the residual clause of the ACCA. Congress should clarify the scope of the
residual clause. The Supreme Court should refine its approach with more
precise opinions that hew closely to the text of the ACCA and prior
precedent. Until they act, however, lower courts have the tools to
discharge their responsibilities to the Constitution, the law, and judicial
precedent.

